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a b s t r a c t 
This paper analyses the relationship between temporary employment and the intensity of on-the-job informal 
learning across 20 developed countries. Using microdata from the OECD’s PIAAC survey, we estimate an instru- 
mented endogenous switching regression model and ﬁnd that temporary employees engage in on-the-job learning 
more intensively than their counterparts in permanent employment. We show that this higher intensity of infor- 
mal learning does not substitute for temporary workers’ lower participation in formal training. Instead, both types 
of learning are complementary. Heterogeneous-eﬀect analyses suggests that early career expectations of gaining 
a permanent contract could explain the higher informal learning investments of employees while in a temporary 
job. 
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1 Table 1 shows the countries included in our analyses. 
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0. Introduction 
During the last two decades, temporary employment has increased
ubstantially in many OECD countries ( OECD, 2014 ). Ideally, on-the-
ob investments in human capital (i.e. training and learning from ex-
erience) in this type of jobs should improve the integration of new
ntrants or unemployed individuals into the labour market. However,
oth in public policy and in the economic literature, there is a debate
bout the opportunities for human capital development associated with
emporary contracts ( Arulampalam and Booth, 1998 ; Booth et al., 2002 ;
ECD, 2014 ). 
Despite the debate and policy relevance, remarkably little is known
bout the diﬀerence between temporary and permanent employees with
espect to the learning content of their jobs. Mainly due to the lack
f appropriate data, the empirical literature has thus far been entirely
ocused on workers’ training participation. In line with human capital
heory, several empirical studies have provided evidence of a negative
elation between temporary contracts and training participation in vari-
us countries (e.g. Arulampalam et al., 2004; Cutulli and Guetto, 2013 ).
he empirical question on whether and, if so, to what extend learning☆ We gratefully acknowledge comments from Lex Borghans, Bart Cockx, Denis de
aymond Montizaan, Kjell Salvanes, Ludger Woessmann, Jeﬀrey Wooldridge, and p
eminar Maastricht (2015), the IEB Workshop on Education Economics (2016), the
ociety for Population Economics (2015), the International Association for Applied
017). We also thank three anonymous referees and a co-editor of this journal for all
∗ Corresponding author at: Maastricht University, School of Business and Economic
E-mail addresses: m.ferreirasequeda@maastrichtuniversity.nl (M. Ferreira), a.degr
.vandervelden@maastrichtuniversity.nl (R. van der Velden). 
ttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2018.08.009 
eceived 22 August 2017; Received in revised form 22 August 2018; Accepted 25 Au
vailable online 27 August 2018 
927-5371/© 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. nformally on the job diﬀers between temporary and permanent employ-
es still remains. 
Policy makers in most OECD countries have become increasingly
ware that informal learning over the working life represents also a
ich source of human capital and skills development, usually recognised
hrough the experience wage premium in the labour market ( OECD,
010 , 2013a ). Although years of experience (or tenure) have played an
mportant role in the economic literature as a proxy for unobservable
nvestments in learning while working ( Mincer, 1974 ), there are hardly
ny empirical studies on the learning potential of diﬀerent jobs or the
xtent to which diﬀerent workers learn from experience ( Rosen, 1972;
esluk and Jacobs, 1998; Heckman et al., 2002 ). 
In this article, we contribute to ﬁlling this gap by providing empir-
cal evidence on the inﬂuence of temporary contracts on the intensity
f informal learning at work across 20 OECD countries. 1 For our anal-
sis, we use unique data from the OECD Programme for International Crombrugghe, Thomas Dohmen, Bart Golsteyn, Colin Green, Olivier Marie, 
articipants of the LEER Workshop on Education Economics (2015), the DUHR 
 ROA Human Capital conference (2016) and the conferences of the European 
 Econometrics (2015), and European Association of Labour Economics (2016, 
 their insightful comments and suggestions. 
s, P.O. Box 616, Maastricht, MD 6200, The Netherlands. 
ip@maastrichtuniversity.nl (A. de Grip), 
gust 2018 
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t  ssessment of Adult Competences (PIAAC) survey conducted in 2011
nd 2012. This is the ﬁrst survey that provides detailed internation-
lly comparable measures of workers’ skills, job-tasks content and in-
ormal learning at work, the latter based on a conceptual framework
hat considers three modes of informal learning: (1) learning by doing,
2) learning from others, and (3) learning by keeping up-to-date with
ew products or services. 
We contribute to the literature on ﬂexible employment and human
apital development in three ways. First, we estimate the extent to which
he intensity of informal learning on the job diﬀers between workers
ith temporary and permanent contracts. In doing so, we raise the issue
f potential endogeneity of enrolment in a temporary job due to selec-
ion based on unobservable characteristics. We not only include several
mportant and previously neglected control variables in the temporary
ontracts literature (such as workers’ skills, learning attitude and task-
ob content) but also implement an endogenous switching regression
odel (SRM) to correct for the expected negative bias in a naïve ordi-
ary least squares (OLS) estimation. To this end, we exploit the diﬀeren-
ial exposure of workers of diﬀerent ages to employment protection leg-
slation (EPL) and potential unemployment, using age-group-by-country
nformation six years prior to the data generation. 2 We obtain consistent
stimates by applying the full-information maximum likelihood (FIML)
ethod and show our estimations to be robust. Our main results show
hat workers in temporary jobs invest more intensively in informal learn-
ng than their counterparts in permanent contracts do, although the for-
er are, in line with the empirical human capital literature, less likely,
n average, to participate in formal training activities. 
Second, we explore the interaction between training and informal
earning to analyse whether there is substitution or complementarity
etween these two types of learning for both temporary and permanent
mployees. We ﬁnd evidence of a complementarity relation, regardless
f the type of contract, which suggests that the higher informal learn-
ng investments of temporary workers do not substitute for the lack of
ormal training. 
Third, we provide marginal treatment eﬀects (MTEs) estimates to
nalyse the heterogeneity in workers’ informal learning along the dis-
ribution of their individual unobserved characteristics. This analysis
hows whether informal learning outcomes for workers on the margin
f a temporary job placement change with the probability of selection
nto a temporary contract by marginally increasing the corresponding
nteraction between the unemployment rate and EPL measures we use
s selection instruments in our identiﬁcation strategy. Allowing for this
ype of heterogeneity reinforces our main ﬁnding: There is a consistent
iﬀerence in on-the-job informal learning between temporary and per-
anent employees in favour of those who have a temporary contract.
nterestingly, this diﬀerence is expected to be larger among workers
ith lower propensities of selection into temporary jobs, that is, those
ho are likely to have better unobservable characteristics (e.g. ability
nd motivation). 
We also provide additional insights on the possible mechanisms
hat could explain our main result. To that aim, we perform several
eterogeneous-eﬀect analyses taking into consideration diﬀerent ob-
ervable individual and job-task content characteristics. In evaluating
his heterogeneity, the most important concern is the possibility that
rms select workers into temporary contracts due to the diﬀerent task
ontent of jobs and/or workers’ diﬀerent levels of skills beyond their
ducational level. This could lead to unobservable diﬀerences in learn-
ng opportunities by contract type. This kind of problem has been2 We use male unemployment rates by country as a selection instrument, 
hich vary within countries across ﬁve-year age groups. We collected these 
nemployment data from six years preceding the respondent’s interview date 
o ensure that, ﬁrst, the current (in sample) and past (in instrument) ﬁve-year 
ge groups refer to the same age group but not to the same cohort of individu- 
ls and, second, that we use consistent unemployment information prior to the 
ccurrence of the global ﬁnancial crisis for all employees in our sample. 
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19 argely overlooked in the literature on ﬂexible employment. We ﬁnd that
mployees with higher levels of numeracy/literacy skills are indeed less
ikely to have temporary contracts. We also ﬁnd that workers with jobs
hat involve tasks of greater skills demand and ﬂexibility have a lower
robability of being selected into temporary contracts and are simul-
aneously more intensively engaged in informal learning. Furthermore,
e ﬁnd some heterogeneity with respect to workers’ age and tenure. 
Although the PIAAC data do not allow us to identify the particular
echanism driving our main ﬁnding, we discuss some heterogeneous-
ﬀect analyses in light of the theoretical idea that expectations of tran-
ition to permanent employment could be responsible for the stronger
ncentives to invest in informal learning while in a temporary job. Ad-
itional results from a diﬀerent cross-country dataset at the European
evel provide descriptive support for this hypothesis. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 dis-
usses the literature related to our research question. Section 3 presents
ur model and empirical strategy and discusses the plausibility of the
dentifying assumptions. Section 4 describes our data. Section 5 presents
ur main empirical results, and robustness and heterogeneity analyses.
ection 6 concludes the paper and discusses its main ﬁndings and im-
lications. 
. Related literature 
Studying how temporary contracts inﬂuence decisions of investment
n informal learning at work in comparison to permanent contracts re-
ates to two strands of economics research. First, the human capital lit-
rature on training investments and, second, the stepping-stone or dead-
nd job eﬀects of temporary contracts. 
From a theoretical perspective, ﬁrms using temporary contracts to
djust the size of their labour force have fewer incentives to invest in
he human capital of these employees because of the shorter expected
mortisation period. Workers in this situation are also expected to invest
ess in the accumulation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills. If that is the case, then the
ursuit of ﬂexible production by ﬁrms could impose negative externali-
ies not only on the skills development of their current ﬂexible workforce
ut also on their long-term productive capacity due to suboptimal ag-
regate training investments ( Arulampalam and Booth, 1998 ). Previous
mpirical studies have conﬁrmed this negative relation between tem-
orary work and training participation ( Atkinson, 1998; Arulampalam
t al., 2004; Steijn et al., 2006; O’Connell and Byrne, 2012; Cutulli and
uetto, 2013 ). Other studies have shown, however, that employers may
nvest in the general training of temporary employees due to the ex-
stence of labour market imperfections ( Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999 )
r to screen workers according to ability prior to oﬀering a permanent
ontract ( Autor, 2001 ). 
The latter reference leads us to the related literature on the stepping-
tone eﬀects of temporary employment. Most research in this ﬁeld has
laimed that on-the-job learning (both training and informal learning)
nd skills development are probably the main channel through which
emporary contracts can oﬀer a path into permanent employment. The
dds of transition to a permanent position are believed to increase with
he improvement of human capital and the gain of productive experi-
nce while in a temporary job ( Autor, 2001; Booth et al., 2002; Gagliar-
ucci, 2005; De Graaf-Zijl et al., 2011; Cockx and Picchio, 2012; Jahn
nd Pozzoli, 2013; Jahn and Rosholm, 2014 ). This strand of literature
uggests that temporary employment could provide workers with fur-
her incentives for investments in on-the-job learning to improve their
kills (or oﬀset the deterioration of their human capital while unem-
loyed) and thereby increase their chances of ﬁnding a more stable job.
onetheless, these studies have also noted that, if temporary jobs are
ecurrent, the stepping-stone prospects decrease and human capital in-
estments are expected to decline. Temporary employment could then
ecome dead-end jobs. 
However, due to the lack of appropriate data, little has been done
o validate that learning on the job could be an important mechanism
M. Ferreira et al. Labour Economics 55 (2018) 18–40 
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l  o explain the transition probabilities from temporary to permanent
mployment. Although we do not aim to test for this mobility, we con-
ribute to this literature by analysing the diﬀerence in the intensity of
nformal learning on the job between workers with temporary and per-
anent contracts, which has not yet been empirically analysed. 
In this respect, our study relates to the literature on human capital
ccumulation, which has explained that, in addition to training partici-
ation, workers’ human capital development over the life course is also
ﬀected by informal learning on the job. Mincer (1974) claims that on-
he-job informal learning probably constitutes the major human cap-
tal investment in the workplace. In the human capital literature, in-
ormal learning has mainly been seen as learning-by-doing or learning
hrough experience. Following the seminal work of Arrow (1962) and
incer (1974) , years of experience (or tenure) have been consid-
red as a proxy for the unobservable investments in informal learn-
ng. However, simply accumulating years of experience assumes that,
or any worker, each hour of work is equally eﬀective in improving
kills ( Heckman et al., 2002 ). Quinones et al. (1995) and Tesluk and
acobs (1998) show that this does not hold, while Maurer and
eiss (2010) show that not everyone is good at learning from experi-
nce. Furthermore, ﬁrms oﬀer diﬀerent levels of learning opportunities
nd jobs diﬀer widely in their learning potential ( Rosen, 1972; Heckman
t al., 2002 ). 3 More recent empirical studies have emphasised that work-
rs are continuously learning by doing and learning from other workers
nd that such knowledge spill-over has a positive eﬀect on their pro-
uctivity ( Destré et al., 2008; De Grip et al., 2016 ). In such settings,
orkers’ human capital increases with tenure and converges towards
he job’s proﬁciency level and the ﬁrm’s job-speciﬁc learning potential.
The literature on informal learning has some important implications
or our study. First, it suggests that both the direct and indirect costs
f investments in training are expected to be higher than those for in-
ormal learning since human capital accumulation and labour supply
ompete for employees’ working time when investing in training, while
hey do not compete in case of learning-by-doing or learning from others
 Heckman et al., 2002 ). Therefore, the analysis on the relation between
raining and temporary contracts could not be extended and generalised
o informal learning. Second, years of experience and tenure are imper-
ect variables to provide information on informal learning on the job.
hus, the question whether the intensity of learning on the job diﬀer
and, if so, to what extent – between employees with temporary and
ermanent contracts still remains. 
. Model and empirical strategy 
Our primary regression equation of interest is 
 L 𝑖 = X 𝑖 β + δT 𝑖 + μ𝑖 (1)
here IL is a continuous variable that measures the on-the-job informal
earning intensity of worker i , X is a vector of covariates composed by
orker and ﬁrm characteristics along with a set of country dummies,
nd T is a binary indicator of the type of contract (T = 1 for employees on
emporary contracts and T = 0 for employees on permanent contracts).
or this model, the diﬀerence in informal learning between workers with
emporary and permanent contracts is measured by the estimate of 𝛿. 
However, the binary indicator of the type of contract T i cannot be
reated as exogenous because it is potentially based on individual self-
election or selection by employers. Unobservable worker characteris-
ics such as ability and motivation ( Loh, 1994; Mincer, 1997; Autor,
001; Givord and Wilner, 2015 ) as well as time preferences and risk3 The heterogeneity of informal learning experiences in the workplace has 
een mostly studied in the management and organisations literature. This het- 
rogeneity depends on the extent to which the ﬁrm or job oﬀers employees op- 
ortunities to undertake challenging tasks, interact with others, organise their 
wn work, and so forth ( Koopmans et al., 2006; De Grip, 2008; Marsick et al., 
009 ). 
a  
p  
b  
I  
g  
t  
t  
20 version ( Weiss, 1986; Mincer, 1997; Belzil and Leonardi, 2007; Berton
nd Garibaldi, 2012 ) could aﬀect both selection into a temporary job
nd investments in informal learning decision, resulting in biased esti-
ates when using OLS. For instance, if the typical individual selected
nto temporary contracts has relatively lower ability or stronger time
references for the present, then the OLS estimate of 𝛿 will underesti-
ate the temporary contract eﬀect. We might expect the bias to also be
egative if employers tend to select temporary workers particularly for
obs of, for example, lower skill demand or lesser task complexity. If we
eel these hypotheses are correct, then we would argue that 𝛿 under-
stimates the inﬂuence of temporary contracts on on-the-job informal
earning. 
We account for the endogeneity of temporary job selection by includ-
ng several important and previously neglected control variables in the
emporary contracts literature and estimating an endogenous switching
egression model. Following Heckman (1978), Heckman and Vytlacil
1999) , and Heckman et al. (2001) , the more general model is the fol-
owing. The potential informal learning outcomes (IL 0 , IL 1 ) of the type
f contract T = ( 0 1 ) are assumed to depend linearly upon observable
ariables X and unobservables 𝜇i , as in Eq. (1) . The temporary contract
ndicator is modelled as a nonlinear function of observables Z i and un-
bservables υ𝑖 and is linked to the observed outcome IL i through the
atent variable T ∗ : 
T ∗ 
𝑖 
= 𝑍 𝑖 𝛾 − 𝜐𝑖 
T 𝑖 = 
{ 
1 , if T ∗ 
𝑖 
> 0 
0 , if T ∗ 
𝑖 
≤ 0 
Prob 
(
𝑇 𝑖 = 1 |𝑍 𝑖 ) = Φ(𝑍 𝑖 𝛾)
Prob 
(
𝑇 𝑖 = 0 |𝑍 𝑖 ) = 1 − Φ(𝑍 𝑖 𝛾)
(2) 
Consistent with our previous conjectures, the conditional indepen-
ence assumption does not hold in these kinds of models. Instead,
i and υ𝑖 are allowed to be correlated by a coeﬃcient 𝜌 and assumed
o be jointly normally distributed ( 𝜇i , v i ) ∼ N (0, Σ) ( Maddala, 1983;
ooldridge, 2010; Greene, 2012 ). Under these assumptions, the bias
aused by the correlation of the type of contract T with omitted vari-
bles is addressed by the nonzero expectation of the error term 𝜇i in
q. (1) , as follows: 
E 
(
I L 𝑖 | 𝑇 𝑖 = 1 , X 𝑖 , Z 𝑖 ) = X 𝑖 β + δ + 𝜌𝜎𝜇
[ 
𝜙
(
− 𝑍 𝑖 𝛾
)
Φ
(
− 𝑍 𝑖 𝛾
)] 
 
(
I L 𝑖 | 𝑇 𝑖 = 0 , 𝑋 𝑖 , 𝑍 𝑖 ) = X 𝑖 β + 𝜌𝜎𝜇
[ 
− 𝜙
(
− 𝑍 𝑖 𝛾
)
1 − Φ
(
− 𝑍 𝑖 𝛾
)] (3) 
Then, the expected diﬀerence in informal learning between tempo-
ary and permanent employees is 
 
(
I L 𝑖 | 𝑇 𝑖 = 1 , 𝑋 𝑖 , Z 𝑖 ) − E (I L 𝑖 | 𝑇 𝑖 = 0 , X 𝑖 , Z 𝑖 ) = δ + 𝜌𝜎𝜇
[ 
𝜙𝑖 
Φ𝑖 
(
1 − Φ𝑖 
)] 
(4) 
here 𝜙𝑖 = 𝜙( − 𝑍 𝑖 𝛾) and Φ𝑖 = Φ( − 𝑍 𝑖 𝛾) , which are the standardised nor-
al density and distribution functions respectively. 
The model is identiﬁed through exclusion restrictions: ﬁrst, includ-
ng at least one instrumental variable in Z that is excluded from the IL
q. (1) and, second, the nonlinearity of the selection Eq. (2) that pro-
ides the temporary contract propensity score p i (Z i ) and thus the corre-
ation between 𝜇i and υ𝑖 . For the former, we exploit variation between
nd within countries in workers’ diﬀerential exposure to potential unem-
loyment by using the corresponding statistics on unemployment rate
y country and age groups as measured six years prior to the survey.
dentiﬁcation thus ﬁrst requires that the unemployment rate at the age-
roup-by-country level induces variation in the probability of having a
emporary contract, conditional on all the other covariates. This rela-
ion indeed exists in our application (see Section 4.2.4 and Panel B of
M. Ferreira et al. Labour Economics 55 (2018) 18–40 
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o  able 4 ). Second, the selection instrument (the unemployment rate at
 − 6) should be independent of the unobserved component in the IL
q. (1) and should not directly aﬀect the intensity of informal learning
t work, conditional on the observed characteristics X . We establish the
dmissibility of our selection instrument in Sections 4 and 5 . 
To yield consistent and eﬃcient estimates of the ATE, we apply the
IML method that simultaneously ﬁt Eqs. (1) and (2) of our model by
inimising the determinant of the covariance matrix associated with
he residuals of the reduced form of the equation system. 
Furthermore, by allowing 𝛽0 ≠ 𝛽1 and/or σ2 0 ≠ σ
2 
1 and 𝜌0 ≠ 𝜌1 , where
2 represents the separate variance of 𝜇i in Σ and 𝜌, or the separate
orrelation parameters for permanent and temporary workers, respec-
ively, we can obtain the interacted endogenous SRM in which the im-
act of observed and/or unobserved characteristics is allowed to vary
etween workers with permanent and temporary contracts ( Maddala,
983; Heckman and Vytlacil, 2005; Wooldridge, 2010 ). Then, model
1) becomes 
 L 𝑖 = 𝑋 𝑖 β0 + δT 𝑖 + T 𝑖 
(
X 𝑖 − X̄ 
)
β1 + 𝜇𝑖 0 + T 𝑖 
(
𝜇𝑖 1 − 𝜇𝑖 0 
)
(5)
Since the type of contract may create interaction eﬀects with X i and
i , heterogeneous eﬀects of temporary employment on investments in
nformal learning on the job may result from both observed (diﬀerences
etween X i 𝛽0 and X i 𝛽1 ) and unobserved personal characteristics (diﬀer-
nces between 𝜇i 1 and 𝜇i 0 ). This way of expressing the model emphasises
ur primary interest in 𝛿, although 𝛿 + ( 𝑋 𝑖 − X ) 𝛽1 is of interest for study-
ng how the ATE changes as a function of observables, that is, to estimate
onconstant treatment eﬀects and ATT ( Wooldridge, 2010 ). The model
lso allows us to estimate treatment eﬀect heterogeneity as a function
f unobservables U D or MTEs ( Quandt, 1972; Heckman and Vytlacil,
999, 2001, 2005 ). This literature shows that the selection probability
nto temporary contracts given by Eq. (2) , which is the propensity score
 i (Z i ), is a valid instrument, given selection on unobservables, and it
an be used to identify MTEs. 4 These are, in our case, the average treat-
ent eﬀects for workers on the margin of a temporary job placement,
 margin that varies with the unemployment and EPL measures we use
s instruments. 
The endogenous SRM oﬀers some advantages over the standard in-
trumental variable (IV) approach. 5 First, the SRM adds more struc-
ure to account for the binary nature of our endogenous regressor. If
he nonlinear model approximates the conditional expected function of
he temporary contract selection better than a linear model, the out-
ome estimates of informal learning investments will be much more
recise than the IV estimator ( Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Wooldridge,
010 , 2015 ). Second, a continuous selection instrument is suitable for4 The MTE is the marginal eﬀect of a temporary contract ( T = 1) on informal 
earning on the job, conditional on X and the unobservables υ from the selec- 
ion Eq. (2) . In the MTE literature, it is customary to trace out the treatment 
ﬀect against the percentiles of the distribution of υ, in line with the following 
ransformation of the selection rule in Eq. (2) : T ∗ 
𝑖 
> 0 if Φ( 𝑍 𝑖 𝛾) > Φ( υ𝑖 ) . Since 
( 𝑍 𝑖 𝛾) = 𝑝 𝑖 ( Z 𝑖 ) represents the selection probability into a temporary contract, 
( υ𝑖 ) = 𝑈 𝐷 denotes the percentiles of the distribution of the unobservable 
ropensity of being selected into a permanent job. The condition T ∗ 
𝑖 
> 0 can 
hen be rewritten as 𝑈 𝐷 ( Z 𝑖 ) > υ𝑖 . The MTE can then be estimated as the partial 
erivative of the conditional expectation of IL with respect to the propensity 
core p i (Z i ), as follows: MTE ( 𝑋 𝑖 = x , 𝑈 𝐷𝑖 = 𝑝 ) = 𝜕𝐸{ 𝐼 𝐿 𝑖 |𝑋 𝑖 = x , 𝑝 𝑖 ( 𝑍 𝑖 ) = 𝑝 }∕ 𝜕𝑝. 
t is thus the treatment eﬀect for individuals with observed characteristics 𝑋 𝑖 = x 
ho are at the U D 
th percentile of the υ distribution, implying these individuals 
re indiﬀerent between a permanent and a temporary contract when the propen- 
ity score p i (Z i ) equals U D . 
5 In the standard case of linear endogenous variables, both the SRM and 2SLS 
ethods lead to the same estimator. When the treatment has a nonlinear eﬀect 
n the outcome or the eﬀect is heterogeneous, however, the methods produce 
iﬀerent estimates. Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) conjecture that the SRM es- 
imator is likely much more precise because it solves the nonlinear endogeneity 
y adding the scalar ̂υ to the regression while keeping the treatment variable in 
he second stage not only the linear projection as in 2SLS. 
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21  binary endogenous regressor, which also facilitates the estimation of
TEs ( Heckman and Vytlacil, 1999; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009 ).
hird, it easily adapts to handle more complicated models, such as
eterogeneous-eﬀect models. The IV approach can be quite ineﬃcient
elative to the more parsimonious SRM approach in this case. Thus, by
llowing the estimation of heterogeneous eﬀects, the SRM can be ap-
lied to estimate ATE as well as ATT and MTEs ( Heckman and Navarro-
ozano, 2004; Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Wooldridge, 2010 , 2015 ). Fi-
ally, in contrast to the SRM approach, 2SLS merely provides local ATEs
nstead of unconditional ATEs that are more policy relevant in the con-
ext of our research question. 
However, this approach, while likely more eﬃcient than an IV ap-
roach, is less robust. The consistency of the FIML estimator of the SRM
inges on the bivariate normality assumption of 𝜇i and υ𝑖 ; thus, it is
symptotically eﬃcient if the temporary contract selection Eq. (2) is cor-
ectly speciﬁed. The better the prediction of selection into a temporary
ob, the more precise the estimates of the informal learning outcome will
e ( Heckman, 1978; Heckman and Vytlacil, 2005; Wooldridge, 2010 ).
ince the beneﬁt of increased precision might be at the cost of a greater
hance of misspeciﬁcation error, we perform various robustness checks
f our estimations. 
. Data and descriptive statistics 
.1. Data and sample 
We use data from the OECD PIAAC survey, conducted in 2011 and
012, based on a representative sample of the population of the par-
icipant countries. 6 This is a unique dataset that provides, for the ﬁrst
ime, internationally comparable measures of informal learning at work,
ased on a conceptual framework that considers three learning path-
ays, namely, learning by doing, learning from others, and learning by
eeping up-to-date with new products or services. Moreover, this dataset
rovides information on several worker, job, tasks and employer char-
cteristics. 
We restrict our sample to full-time male workers 7 – excluding self-
mployed and armed forces employees – aged 17 to 65, not participating
n any formal education programme, and who have an employment con-
ract that is not an apprenticeship or other training scheme. The sample
onsists of 25,853 observations 8 for 20 OECD countries, 9 with 88.2%
ermanent contracts and 11.8% temporary contracts. The distribution
f permanent and temporary contracts in the sample is similar and6 See OECD (2014b) for further details about data validation. 
7 We focus on males due to the higher probability of working career interrup- 
ions among women. Temporary jobs could diﬀer in signiﬁcance between men 
nd women, since women might prefer career ﬂexibility throughout a signiﬁcant 
ortion of their working lives ( Booth et al., 2002 ). 
8 In Canada, the sample consisted of 5,044 cases, from which we took a ran- 
om sample of 1,193 cases to reduce bias due to oversampling of the Canadian 
espondents. 
9 Four countries were excluded from our sample: Australia, Cyprus, the Rus- 
ian Federation, and the United States. Australian data were not available 
ue to conﬁdentiality reasons. OECD statistics for Cyprus were not available. 
ata from the Russian Federation were preliminary and considered by the 
ECD (2014b) to not be representative of the population. Finally, the partic- 
lar characteristics of the US labour market led to a loss of 58% of observations 
ue to employees who stated not having any contract at all. In that case, only 
87 nonrandom observations would have remained in our sample, of which 
1.3% presumably corresponded to temporary jobs, a percentage very diﬀerent 
rom the OECD statistic, which estimates only 4.2% temporary employment in 
he United States. Therefore, our main variable of interest would capture some- 
hing diﬀerent in the United States, not comparable to other countries. As shown 
y the ILO (2010) and the OECD (2006) , due to very low EPL, the distinction 
etween temporary and permanent employment is of much less signiﬁcance in 
he United States. 
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Table 1 
Sample description. 
Country Sample obs. % Permanent % % OECD stats Temporary % % OECD stats 
1 Austria 1269 4.9 1191 93.9 90.7 78 6.1 9.3 
2 Belgium 1216 4.7 1162 95.6 92.9 54 4.4 7.1 
3 Canada 1193 4.6 1073 89.9 87.0 120 10.1 13.0 
4 Czech Republic 1193 4.6 1029 86.3 92.6 164 13.7 7.4 
5 Denmark 1747 6.8 1637 93.7 92.2 110 6.3 7.8 
6 Estonia 1598 6.2 1453 90.9 95.3 145 9.1 4.7 
7 Finland 1265 4.9 1162 91.9 87.2 103 8.1 12.8 
8 France 1682 6.5 1536 91.3 85.6 146 8.7 14.4 
9 Germany 1361 5.3 1225 90.0 86.1 136 10.0 13.9 
10 Ireland 939 3.6 809 86.2 90.1 130 13.8 9.9 
11 Italy 930 3.6 839 90.2 87.1 91 9.8 12.9 
12 Japan 1507 5.8 1342 89.1 91.4 165 10.9 8.6 
13 Korea 1164 4.5 907 77.9 78.9 257 22.1 21.1 
14 Netherlands 1172 4.5 1035 88.3 81.4 137 11.7 18.6 
15 Norway 1226 4.7 1166 95.1 93.3 60 4.9 6.7 
16 Poland 1536 5.9 952 62.0 72.6 584 38.0 27.4 
17 Slovak Republic 1193 4.6 1021 85.6 93.6 172 14.4 6.4 
18 Spain 1096 4.2 923 84.2 78.0 173 15.8 22.0 
19 Sweden 1178 4.6 1101 93.5 85.7 77 6.5 14.3 
20 United Kingdom 1388 5.4 1232 88.8 94.1 156 11.2 5.9 
Total 25,853 100 22,795 88.2 87.8 3058 11.8 12.2 
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13 The variable is derived from the survey question what kind of employment 
contract do you have? The answer options were (1) an indeﬁnite contract, (2) ositively correlated (Pearson’s correlation = 0.79) to that distribution
n the OECD statistics published for 2012 (see Table 1 ). 10 
.2. Variables 
.2.1. Outcome variable 
On-the-job informal learning intensity is an index 11 derived from the
ollowing questions; all measured on a ﬁve-point Likert scale 12 : 
a) How often do you learn new work-related things from co-workers or
supervisors? 
b) How often does your job involve learning-by-doing from the tasks
you perform? 
c) How often does your job involve keeping up-to-date with new prod-
ucts or services? 
This variable takes the lowest value if all three questions were an-
wered ‘never’ and the highest if all were answered ‘every day’. To fa-
ilitate the interpretation of results, the variable was standardised. In
able 2 , which presents summary statistics, we observe that practically
very person learns something on the job (98% informal learning inci-
ence), with no signiﬁcant diﬀerence by type of contract. Nonetheless,
he mean value of informal learning intensity among temporary workers
0.07) is signiﬁcantly higher than that of permanent employees (0.01).
n contrast, we observe that the latter participate signiﬁcantly more of-
en in formal job-related training. 10 According to OECD concepts, temporary employment includes dependent 
orkers (i.e. wage and salary workers) whose job has a predetermined termina- 
ion date or both the employer and the employee understand that the duration 
f the job is limited. Statistics are comparable across countries, since national 
eﬁnitions broadly conform to this generic deﬁnition. 
11 This index was derived by the OECD using the generalised partial credit 
odel estimated by weighted likelihood. Its validity was assessed based on cross- 
ountry comparability, scale reliability and scale correlations ( OECD, 2014 b). 
ur ﬁndings are robust to diﬀerent constructions of the index; for example, very 
imilar results are obtained when using the standardised principal component 
actor of the three statements. 
12 The response rate to these questions was 98%, with the following answer 
ptions: (1) never, (2) less than once a month, (3) less than once a week but at 
east once a month, (4) at least once a week but not every day, and (5) every 
ay. 
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22 .2.2. Explanatory variable 
The temporary contract variable is a dummy variable that takes the
alue one for temporary contracts and zero for permanent contracts.
emporary contracts in our sample include ﬁxed-term positions (90.5%)
nd agency work (9.5%). 13 
.2.3. Control variables 
As suggested by the empirical human capital literature, we con-
rol for age, educational level (years of education proxied by the high-
st level of education obtained), educational mismatch (dummies for
vereducation and undereducation), 14 learning attitude, 15 numeracy
est score as measured by the PIACC––OECD test, ﬁrm tenure, actual
eekly working hours, ﬁrm size (ﬁve categories), occupation (nine ISCO
ne-digit categories), industry (21 ISIC one-digit categories), year of in-
erview (dummy), and country-ﬁxed eﬀects. 
Table 2 shows that temporary employees in our sample are gener-
lly younger and have fewer years of work experience and tenure than
ermanent workers. The average test scores in both numeracy and lit-
racy are also shown to be lower among temporary workers. Moreover,
mong individuals in temporary positions, there is a higher share of
vereducated workers and a lower proportion employed in skilled oc-
upations, large ﬁrms, and the tertiary sector of the economy. It is worth ﬁxed-term contract, (3) a temporary employment agency contract, (4) an ap- 
renticeship or other training scheme, and (5) no contract. 
14 These dummies are derived from the following question: Thinking about 
hether this qualiﬁcation is necessary for doing your job satisfactorily, which 
f the following statements would be truest? The answer options were (1) this 
evel is necessary, (2) a lower level would be suﬃcient, and (3) a higher level 
ould be needed. 
15 This variable is a standardised index derived by the OECD (labelled learn- 
ng readiness) from the following questions, all measured on a ﬁve-point Likert 
cale: (1) When I hear or read about new ideas, I try to relate them to real-life 
ituations to which they might apply; (2) I like learning new things; (3) when I 
ome across something new, I try to relate it to what I already know; (4) I like to 
et to the bottom of diﬃcult things; (5) I like to ﬁgure out how diﬀerent ideas 
t together; and (6) if I don’t understand something, I look for additional infor- 
ation to make it clearer. This variable was constructed by the OECD based on 
he work of Kirby et al. (2003) . Learning attitude describes workers’ interests in 
earning and information-processing strategies and it is considered a metacog- 
itive ability that structures the learning process and aﬀects learning eﬃciency. 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics. 
Variable Permanent Temporary Diﬀ. All 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. p -value Min Max 
Informal learning incidence 0.98 0.14 0.97 0.17 0.254 0 1 
Informal learning intensity (original scale) 3.40 1.09 3.51 1.18 0.001 1 5 
Informal learning intensity (standardised index) 0.01 0.95 0.07 1.06 0.001 − 3.28 2.05 
Training (participation) a 0.52 0.50 0.39 0.49 0.000 0 1 
Missed training due to a random event a 0.24 0.15 0.24 0.15 0.986 0 1 
Age 42.12 11.11 35.95 12.78 0.000 17 65 
Years of education 13.30 2.89 12.92 3.09 0.167 3 22 
Work experience (years) 21.37 11.68 14.58 12.54 0.000 0 47 
Overeducated 0.23 0.42 0.30 0.46 0.005 0 1 
Undereducated 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.23 0.111 0 1 
Learning attitude (standardised index) 0.00 0.99 − 0.02 1.09 0.221 − 6.81 8.81 
Tenure (years) 11.90 10.26 4.43 7.30 0.000 0 45 
Weekly working hours 42.53 7.29 42.58 8.36 0.757 28 60 
Numeracy skills score 285.73 47.99 270.16 49.29 0.000 90.41 414.02 
Literacy skills score 281.40 43.67 271.42 46.59 0.000 85.82 436.59 
Interviewed in 2012 0.40 0.49 0.36 0.48 0.064 0 1 
Occupation 
Managers 0.10 0.30 0.05 0.21 0.000 0 1 
Professionals 0.18 0.38 0.15 0.35 0.000 0 1 
Technicians and associate professionals 0.18 0.39 0.11 0.31 0.000 0 1 
Clerical support workers 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.27 0.080 0 1 
Services and sales workers 0.09 0.28 0.11 0.32 0.001 0 1 
Skilled agricultural and ﬁshery workers 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.13 0.003 0 1 
Craft and related trades workers 0.18 0.39 0.22 0.41 0.000 0 1 
Plant and machine operators 0.13 0.34 0.17 0.37 0.000 0 1 
Elementary occupations 0.05 0.22 0.11 0.31 0.000 0 1 
Industry 
Agriculture, forestry and ﬁshing 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.16 0.056 0 1 
Manufacturing 0.30 0.46 0.30 0.46 0.358 0 1 
Construction 0.11 0.31 0.14 0.34 0.000 0 1 
Sales, transport, accommodation and food services 0.22 0.41 0.20 0.40 0.039 0 1 
Information and communication 0.05 0.21 0.02 0.16 0.000 0 1 
Finance 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.13 0.002 0 1 
Real estate 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.10 0.138 0 1 
Professional, technical and administration services 0.08 0.26 0.09 0.28 0.051 0 1 
Public administration, education and health 0.17 0.38 0.15 0.36 0.011 0 1 
Other services 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.20 0.049 0 1 
Firm size 
Firm size 1–10 0.20 0.40 0.24 0.43 0.000 0 1 
Firm size 11–50 0.30 0.46 0.32 0.47 0.014 0 1 
Firm size 51 − 250 0.25 0.44 0.24 0.43 0.099 0 1 
Firm size 251–1000 0.14 0.35 0.12 0.33 0.005 0 1 
Firm size > 1000 0.10 0.30 0.07 0.26 0.000 0 1 
Observations 22,795 3058 25,853 
Selection instruments 
Unemployment rate t − 6 (by country and age groups) 6.39 4.32 10.66 7.53 0.000 0 0.58 
Unemployment rate t − 6 (standardised) − 0.08 0.81 0.70 1.54 0.000 − 1.16 10.17 
EPL regular employment (index) 2.12 0.56 2.17 0.54 0.000 0.92 3.05 
EPL regular employment (standardised) 0.09 0.99 0.13 0.98 0.000 − 1.89 1.56 
EPL temporary employment (index) 1.52 1.19 1.34 1.07 0.000 0.05 3.93 
EPL temporary employment (standardised) 0.04 1.00 − 0.11 0.98 0.000 − 1.19 2.06 
a Due to lower response rate, we have fewer observations for these variables (23,232). 
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our sample and, second, that this unemployment information is measured before 
the ﬁnancial crisis. Therefore, unemployment rates for 2005 and 2006 were 
correspondingly used for individuals interviewed in 2011 and 2012. Since we entioning that there is no descriptive diﬀerence between permanent
nd temporary employees regarding years of education, undereduca-
ion, learning attitude, and working hours. 
.2.4. Selection instrumental variables 
To exploit workers’ diﬀerential exposure to potential unemployment,
e use as a selection instrument in our model the annual male unem-
loyment rate six years preceding the respondent’s interview date, 16 16 We use unemployment data from year t-6 to ensure that, ﬁrst, the current and 
ast ﬁve-year age groups are equivalent but not the same cohort of individuals in 
e
t
u
u
23 hich varies both between countries and within countries across ﬁve-
ear age groups. We collected these data from the OECD Statistics web-
ite. xploit unemployment variation across speciﬁc labour market segments rather 
han changes in unemployment over time, our results are robust to the use of 
nemployment data before 2005. For example, similar results are obtained when 
sing unemployment data from 2001 to 2004. 
M. Ferreira et al. Labour Economics 55 (2018) 18–40 
Fig. 1. Correlation graphs between unemployment rate and temporary contracts 
This ﬁgure shows the correlation between the share of temporary contracts and the unemployment rate six years before, by corresponding country and age group. 
Each graph is a binned scatterplot of 100 bins. Linear estimation is shown, after controlling for age and country-ﬁxed eﬀects. 
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2  The unemployment rate is a relevant selection instrument for the
ndividual probability of having a temporary contract. Unemployment
easures have been shown to be correlated with the subsequent inci-
ence of temporary employment ( Wasmer, 1999; Holmlund and Stor-
ie, 2002; Virtanen et al., 2005; Kahn, 2010 ). 17 The average likelihood
hat workers will be employed in temporary jobs increases with rela-
ively high unemployment rates. This is expected, since temporary jobs
ave been promoted as a mechanism to improve the labour market in-
egration of the unemployed ( Gagliarducci, 2005; Gebel, 2013 ) and be-
ause a higher unemployment rate often means a risk for the active
orking population and job seekers that reduces the chances of ﬁnd-
ng more stable employment ( European Commission, 2010 ). If employ-
ent prospects are tight, workers anticipate scarce opportunities in the
abour market; therefore, the probability of accepting temporary con-
racts is higher (Abraham, 1990; Holmlund and Storrie, 2002; Givord
nd Wilner, 2015 ). Moreover, if there is excess supply in the labour
arket, ﬁrms are more willing to make use of temporary contracts as
 low-cost short-run buﬀer or as a probationary period ( Wasmer, 1999;
agliarducci, 2005; Givord and Wilner, 2015 ). 18 Temporary employ-
ent then involves more employable individuals who could have had
ermanent contracts if the economic conditions had been better and vice
ersa ( Wasmer, 1999; Givord and Wilner, 2015 ). 
Table 2 shows that the average value of the unemployment rate six
ears prior to the respondent’s interview date is three percentage points
igher for the group of temporary workers than for the permanent em-
loyees in our sample. We ﬁnd that the national unemployment rate by
ge has a signiﬁcant Pearson’s correlation of 0.57 with the temporary
ontract dummy of our sample. Fig. 1 shows this positive correlation,
fter controlling for age and country-ﬁxed eﬀects. To conﬁrm that the
ositive correlation is not fully determined by the extremely high un-17 Transitions from unemployment to temporary or permanent employment 
nd from temporary to permanent contracts are likely to depend on the labour 
arket’s structure. If the pool of unemployed is large, transition rates from un- 
mployment into temporary jobs are higher than the ﬂow from unemployment 
o permanent jobs ( Wasmer, 1999, Holmlund and Storrie, 2002 ). Similarly, if 
he unemployment rate is high, the probability that a temporary contract is con- 
erted into a permanent contract is lower ( Wasmer, 1999, Givord and Wilner, 
015 ). 
18 The greater value of hiring a worker with a temporary contract comes from 
he employer’s right to dismiss unproductive or mismatched workers at a lower 
ost. In Wasmer’s (1999) model, if the unemployment rate is relatively high, 
rms use more temporary contracts, and accordingly, the eﬀect of a higher un- 
mployment rate is to increase the share of temporary jobs. 
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24 mployment rates, the left-hand graph excludes unemployment rates
igher than 15%, and the right-hand graph, the rates higher than 10%.
n Section 5 , we formally conﬁrm the existence, statistical signiﬁcance
nd robustness of this correlation in our SRM application. 
Since the exogeneity of our selection instrument cannot be tested, it
ould be questioned if unemployment rates at the age-group-by-country
evel would aﬀect workplace informal learning at the individual level
ix years later – due to a link with unobserved confounding factors.
he ﬁrst questioning seems to be obviously related to the type of con-
ract an employee has: If workers are aware that the past unemployment
ate was relatively high for their equivalent age group, they might face
enure uncertainty that might encourage them to invest more in on-the-
ob learning. However, this job tenure uncertainty mainly depends on
hether the job contract is permanent or temporary. 
Alternatively, the exogeneity of the unemployment rate could be
uestioned on the basis of an indirect link with some individual or job
haracteristics that are omitted from Eq. (1) . This should, however, not
e a concern in our setting for at least two reasons. First, we are able to
ake account of previously neglected control variables in the temporary
ontracts literature, including a large set of job task-content characteris-
ics and some further individual characteristics. Second, several studies
n individuals’ preferences have shown that adults’ preferences at the
ndividual level are highly stable and correlated over time and that any
emaining instability is largely attributable to measurement error ( De
liveira et al., 2012; Meier and Sprenger, 2015; Chuang and Schechter,
015; Hardardóttir, 2017 ). Moreover, sporadic changes in individual
references have been shown to be related to individuals’ own experi-
nces rather than to the use of available historical data or macroeco-
omic developments ( Bucciol and Zarri, 2015 ; Malmendier and Nagel,
011, 2016 ). These changes have been commonly studied in relation
o extreme experiences such as a natural disaster, a violent event or an
conomic crisis, which have been shown to be correlated to increases
n risk aversion and impatience ( Guisoet al., 2013; Cameron and Shah,
015; Cohn et al., 2015; Callen et al., 2014 ). Individuals have also been
ound to be inﬂuenced more strongly by recent than distant experi-
nces since the memory of these events vanishes over time ( Malmendier
nd Nagel, 2011, 2016 ). Drastic changes in macroeconomic variables
uch as unemployment could then be correlated with people’s subjec-
ive preferences. However, this does not hamper our empirical strat-
gy. First, we exploit variation in unemployment across speciﬁc labour
arket segments rather than unemployment shocks or changes in un-
mployment over time. Second, the literature suggests that aggregate
easures of unemployment are not expected to be correlated to individ-
al preferences unless an individual unemployment experience occurs
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Table 3 
Unemployment rate 2005/2006 and workers’ personal and job-task characteristics 2011/2012. 
Unemployment rate (std.) (1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Job satisfaction − 0.002 0.000 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Learning motivation − 0.002 − 0.003 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Social trust 0.003 0.003 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Political eﬃcacy perception 0.004 0.002 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Health status − 0.005 − 0.004 
(0.005) (0.005) 
Task ﬂexibility 0.004 − 0.000 
(0.006) (0.004) 
Task collaboration and teamwork 0.002 − 0.000 
(0.004) (0.003) 
Problem-solving tasks − 0.001 − 0.004 
(0.004) (0.003) 
Planning tasks − 0.001 − 0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Physical tasks 0.004 0.002 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Numeracy-related tasks 0.002 − 0.002 
(0.004) (0.003) 
Literacy-related tasks − 0.004 − 0.005 
(0.004) (0.006) 
ICT-related tasks − 0.002 − 0.003 
(0.005) (0.003) 
Other controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
N 23,020 25,846 25,850 25,795 25,748 25,845 25,413 25,817 25,804 23,448 25,840 25,853 25,852 25,853 
R 2 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.836 0.836 0.834 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.835 
Notes. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the age-group-by-country level. The standardised unemployment rate 
(at the age-group-by-country level, six years prior to the interview) is the dependent variable. Other controls include age and country-ﬁxed eﬀects. 
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y   Bucciol and Zarri, 2015 ; Malmendier and Nagel, 2011, 2016; Hardard-
ttir, 2017 ). Third, it is important to note that the exogeneity of our
nstrument is further reinforced by using its lagged nature, that is, ag-
regate unemployment rates being measured six years preceding the
urvey generating our main data – which means that the current and
ast ﬁve-year age groups are equivalent but not the same cohort of in-
ividuals 19 – and prior to the occurrence of the global ﬁnancial crisis. 
Although we cannot formally test for the exogeneity of the unem-
loyment rate at the age-group-by-country level, we can provide some
vidence that this instrument is orthogonal to some obvious aspects such
s skill levels, job satisfaction, learning motivation, or the job’s tasks six
ears later. Table 3 reports the results of a battery of OLS regressions
ith our instrument as the dependent variable and some individual and
ask characteristics that could inﬂuence the opportunities and motiva-
ion for informal learning as explanatory variables. These results con-
rm the intuition that the unemployment rate at time t − 6 does not
orrelate signiﬁcantly with any of these observable individual charac-
eristics, whether the explanatory variables are included all together or
ne by one. This suggests that our selection instrument is likely to be
rthogonal to other unobservable characteristics of similar nature. In
rincipal, we could consider including the variables in Table 3 as con-
rol variables in our main model, but we prefer to exclude them since
ome of them could induce further endogeneity, whereas others could
apture the impact of more relevant general variables, such as the em-
loyee’s occupation or learning attitude. 20 
An additional argument that could question the validity of our ex-
lusion restriction relates to the technology of skill development over
he life cycle ( Cunha and Heckman, 2007 ). If acquired skills raise both19 e.g. for employees in the age 35-39 interviewed in 2011 in our sample, we 
ssign as instrument the country unemployment rate of those in the age 35-39 
n 2005, when the employees referred were 29–33 years old. 
20 Including these variables, however, does not substantially change our main 
esults. See Section 5.4.2 . 
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25 he level and productivity of subsequent learning investments in life,
ndividuals exposed to a high level of unemployment for their age group
ay feel pushed to invest more in schooling, thus boosting their accu-
ulation of human capital process over their life span. This however
oes not invalidate our exclusion restriction since not only individuals’
ears of education but also their skill levels are properly accounted for in
ur speciﬁcation. A high level of unemployment could also lead to age-
argeted training policies for the unemployed. This might again lead to
ub-groups of the population with a boosted accumulation of human
apital. If this would not be correctly captured by the observable char-
cteristics included in X (e.g. skill level, occupation, industry), potential
iﬀerences in human capital accumulation within age groups could pose
 threat to the validity of our instrument. Table 3 partly shows that this
s not likely to be the case because, as we have explained, this argument
s related to individuals’ own experience of unemployment and the cur-
ent and past ﬁve-year age groups do not refer to the same cohort of
ndividuals in our setting. Nonetheless, to provide more insight into this
iscussion, we perform some analyses using information on training par-
icipation among the unemployed individuals in our dataset. As shown
n Table A1 , there does not seem to be a signiﬁcant association between
he contemporary (2011–2012) unemployment rates at the age-group-
y-country level and the participation in (job-related) training among
he unemployed individuals. 
Moreover, as suggested in the literature, training programs for the
nemployed in OECD countries are typically targeted on unemployment
eneﬁt recipients. Age does not usually deﬁne the main target groups
nd when it does, it refers to the more generic categorisation (e.g. youth,
ounger adults and older adults). These training programmes more of-
en aim at a rapid reintegration to the labour market (job-search train-
ng and tackling skill deﬁcits) instead of human capital accumulation.
tudies that evaluate the eﬀectiveness of these programs ﬁnd that vari-
tion in participation is largely explained by the diﬀerent institutional
nvironments and individual characteristics and preferences, includ-
ng individual unemployment duration history, educational level, fam-
M. Ferreira et al. Labour Economics 55 (2018) 18–40 
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ply income, among others ( Heckman and Smith, 2004; OECD, 2013b;
aliendo and Schmidl, 2016 ). Based on this discussion, we consider our
election instrument to be credibly valid. 
Finally, we estimate an alternative speciﬁcation in which we use the
nemployment rate interacted with the OECD EPL indexes for perma-
ent and temporary employment as selection instrument. 21 With this
nstrument we build on the expectation that the relation between un-
mployment and the probability of having a temporary contract may
iﬀer by country because of the strictness of EPL. Stricter rules appli-
able to permanent (temporary) employment may tend to increase (de-
rease) the incidence of temporary work and aﬀect the extent to which
emporary contracts are converted into permanent ones ( Booth et al.,
002; Holmlund and Storrie, 2002; OECD, 2004; Gagliarducci, 2005;
ahn, 2010; Sala et al., 2012 ). In Table 2 we observe that, indeed, the
verage value of EPL applicable to permanent (temporary) employment
s slightly higher (lower) for the group of temporary workers in our sam-
le. 
. Empirical results 
.1. On-the-job informal learning intensity 
Our main results are reported in Table 4 . The ﬁrst speciﬁcation gives
he estimates of an ordinary OLS regression. Speciﬁcations (2) and (3)
how the coeﬃcients from standard 2SLS estimations. Speciﬁcations (4)
nd (5) provide the FIML results obtained from our identiﬁcation strat-
gy, that is, the endogenous SRM described in Section 3 . Panel A of
able 4 shows the linear estimates of the informal learning equation
nd Panel B the corresponding linear/probit estimates of the temporary
ontract equation. In all the regressions, standard errors are clustered at
he age-group-by-country level which is the exact level of variation of
he selection instrument. 
The results in Table 4 provide clear evidence of a signiﬁcant diﬀer-
nce in on-the-job informal learning between temporary and permanent
mployees, in favour of those who have a temporary contract. Compared
ith the OLS estimates, the coeﬃcients from the estimations that ac-
ount for the endogeneity of temporary contracts are adjusted upwards,
n line with the negative bias we expected. 
As discussed in Section 3 , we consider the FIML estimates presented
n columns (4) and (5) the preferred regressions. The main result of our
tudy is the positive and signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the intensity of on-the-
ob informal learning between workers with temporary and permanent
ontracts. Speciﬁcations (4) and (5) show that, once selection into the
ontract type is controlled for, the estimated ATE of interest increases
rom 0.09 to 0.22. This result implies that workers in temporary jobs
nvest, on average, 0.22 of a standard deviation more in on-the-job in-
ormal learning than their counterparts in permanent employment. 22 
he size of this coeﬃcient seems to be substantial if we consider that it
s similar to the impact of approximately 10 years of schooling. 
We consider the FIML estimates more appropriate for various rea-
ons. First, the nonlinear prediction of selection into temporary con-
racts is more accurate. Whereas the linear predictions from the 2SLS
rst stage range from − 1.68 to 0.71 (with a mean standard error of
.09), leaving 26% of the sample below zero, the probit probabilities
rom the FIML estimations range from 0.01 to 0.84 (with a mean stan-
ard error of 0.02), which provides better common support. Second, the21 EPL for permanent employment is a weighted indicator concerning the reg- 
lations for individual and collective dismissals. EPL for temporary employment 
s a weighted indicator concerning regulation on the use of ﬁxed-term and tem- 
orary agency contracts. 
22 The coeﬃcients for temporary contracts in speciﬁcations (4) and (5) are not 
igniﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other. Including the EPL measures as selection 
nstruments has very little eﬀect, which suggests that the country ﬁxed eﬀects 
bsorb most of the explanatory power of the national diﬀerences in employment 
egulations. 
A
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26 izes of the instrument coeﬃcients diﬀer signiﬁcantly between the 2SLS
nd FIML speciﬁcations. In column (4), for instance, an increase of one
tandard deviation in the unemployment rate, on average, increases the
robability of being in a temporary contract by 1.5 percentage points.
n column (2), the same eﬀect predicted by the 2SLS is 4.8 percent-
ge points, three times bigger. The size of the probit marginal eﬀect is
loser to that in related research, for example, Kahn’s (2010) . Third,
s we observe, the 2SLS approach inﬂates the estimate for temporary
ontracts, which might be due to the less precise prediction provided in
he selection equation and because the use of a continuous instrument
or the temporary contract variable makes the local ATE estimation less
traightforward. 23 Moreover, as we show in Section 5.4 , there is some
mportant heterogeneity in our application, which signiﬁcantly reduces
he eﬃciency of the standard IV estimation. Fourth, we observe some
mplausible estimates in the 2SLS outcome equations, such as positive
onsigniﬁcant coeﬃcients for age and tenure. Fifth, the Wald tests for
peciﬁcations (4) and (5) indicate with 95% conﬁdence that we can
eject the null hypothesis of no correlation between the errors of the
emporary contract and informal learning equations, so that our instru-
ented endogenous SRM ﬁts well overall. The estimated correlation be-
ween the temporary contract equation errors and the outcome errors
is negative ( − 0.09), indicating that unobservables that raise informal
earning tend to occur with unobservables that lower temporary contract
election. This ﬁnding is coherent with our hypothesis on the unobserv-
bles mentioned in Section 3 ; for instance, people with greater ability
r lower time discount rate are less likely to be selected into temporary
obs and are at the same time more likely to invest in human capital on
he job ( Mincer 1997 ). Last but not least, in contrast to the FIML ap-
roach 2SLS does not provide ATEs but, instead, local ATEs, the former
eing more policy relevant in the context of our research question. 
Concerning the admissibility of our instrument, the Wald and F-tests
fter nonlinear and linear ﬁrst-stage estimations, respectively show that
he unemployment rate, in addition to the other covariates, makes a sig-
iﬁcant contribution to the temporary contract prediction. Furthermore,
he LR-tests in the models (4) and (5) conﬁrm that the instrumented
odels ﬁt the data signiﬁcantly better than the constrained model that
oes not include any instrument. 
Most of our control variables aﬀect the dependent variable according
o the expectations from human capital theory (e.g. Ben-Porath, 1967;
eckman, 1976; Killingsworth, 1982 ). We ﬁnd a quadratic relation be-
ween on-the-job informal learning and age, suggesting a minimum turn-
ng point of investments at the end of employees’ working life. 24 Years
f education are positively correlated with learning in the workplace,
lthough overeducated employees tend to invest less in informal learn-
ng than workers in a well-matched job, while undereducated employees
nvest more. 25 There is also a positive relation between informal learn-
ng intensity and learning attitude and working hours and a negative
elation with tenure and the numeracy skills score. We also ﬁnd that in-
ormal learning tends to be signiﬁcantly higher for individuals employed
n high-skilled occupations and larger ﬁrms. 
As discussed in the introduction, our main ﬁnding could be ratio-
alised by several mechanisms. Even though we cannot test all of them
ith our data, in Sections 5.3 and 5.4 , we present additional results that
rovide further insights into these possible mechanisms. 23 Because of the continuous measures of unemployment and EPL, the local 
TE is not very informative since it refers to an unidentiﬁable segment of the 
opulation. 
24 The estimated average minimum (68 years) at which informal learning starts 
ncreasing with age is not very meaningful. However, as shown in Section 5.4.1 , 
his is because investments in informal learning diﬀer by age between perma- 
ent and temporary employees. 
25 Our estimations control for the fact that workers have a job at the appro- 
riate educational level. Nonetheless, estimations that do not control for educa- 
ional mismatches yield to very similar results (see Table A2 ). 
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Table 4 
Estimations of on-the-job informal learning. 
OLS 
(1) 
2SLS - LATE 
(2) 
2SLS – LATE 
(3) 
FIML – ATE 
(4) 
FIML – ATE 
(5) 
A. Informal Learning 
Temporary contract 0.089 ∗∗∗ 1.375 ∗∗∗ 1.019 ∗∗∗ 0.223 ∗∗∗ 0.221 ∗∗∗ 
(0.021) (0.392) (0.312) (0.045) (0.045) 
Age − 0.027 ∗∗∗ 0.016 ∗ 0.009 − 0.023 ∗∗∗ − 0.023 ∗∗∗ 
(0.005) (0.010) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) 
Age 2 ( ∗ 100) 0.018 ∗∗∗ − 0.032 ∗∗∗ − 0.023 ∗∗ 0.017 ∗∗∗ 0.017 ∗∗∗ 
(0.006) (0.012) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) 
Years of education 0.019 ∗∗∗ 0.022 ∗∗∗ 0.021 ∗∗∗ 0.019 ∗∗∗ 0.019 ∗∗∗ 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Overeducated − 0.102 ∗∗∗ − 0.126 ∗∗∗ − 0.120 ∗∗∗ − 0.105 ∗∗∗ − 0.105 ∗∗∗ 
(0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
Undereducated 0.138 ∗∗∗ 0.137 ∗∗∗ 0.137 ∗∗∗ 0.137 ∗∗∗ 0.137 ∗∗∗ 
(0.021) (0.024) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) 
Learning attitude (std.) 0.203 ∗∗∗ 0.203 ∗∗∗ 0.203 ∗∗∗ 0.203 ∗∗∗ 0.203 ∗∗∗ 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Numeracy skills (std.) − 0.033 ∗∗∗ − 0.015 − 0.019 ∗∗ − 0.031 ∗∗∗ − 0.031 ∗∗∗ 
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
Tenure − 0.003 ∗∗∗ 0.006 ∗∗ 0.005 ∗∗∗ − 0.002 ∗∗ − 0.002 ∗∗ 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Working hours 0.007 ∗∗∗ 0.008 ∗∗∗ 0.007 ∗∗∗ 0.007 ∗∗∗ 0.007 ∗∗∗ 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Other controls yes yes yes yes yes 
B. Temporary Contract AME AME 
Unemployment rate (std.) 0.048 ∗∗∗ 0.041 ∗∗∗ 0.015 ∗∗∗ 0.011 ∗∗∗ 
(0.011) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
EPL permanent (std.) 0.405 ∗∗∗ 0.308 ∗∗∗ 
(0.148) (0.116) 
EPL temporary (std.) − 0.222 ∗∗ − 0.193 ∗∗∗ 
(0.093) (0.062) 
Unemployment ∗ EPL permanent 0.020 ∗∗ 0.012 ∗∗ 
(0.008) (0.005) 
Unemployment ∗ EPL temporary 0.007 ∗∗ 0.009 ∗∗∗ 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Age − 0.019 ∗∗∗ − 0.020 ∗∗∗ − 0.017 ∗∗∗ − 0.017 ∗∗∗ 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Age 2 ( ∗ 100) 0.024 ∗∗∗ 0.025 ∗∗∗ 0.021 ∗∗∗ 0.021 ∗∗∗ 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Years of education − 0.002 − 0.002 − 0.000 − 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Overeducated 0.018 ∗∗∗ 0.017 ∗∗∗ 0.016 ∗∗∗ 0.016 ∗∗∗ 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Undereducated 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Learning attitude (std.) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Numeracy skills (std.) − 0.014 ∗∗∗ − 0.014 ∗∗∗ − 0.014 ∗∗∗ − 0.014 ∗∗∗ 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Tenure − 0.007 ∗∗∗ − 0.007 ∗∗∗ − 0.009 ∗∗∗ − 0.009 ∗∗∗ 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Working hours − 0.001 − 0.001 − 0.001 ∗∗ − 0.001 ∗∗ 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Other controls yes yes yes yes 
First-stage tests F(51; 25,800) = 40.0 F(55; 25,796) = 34.45 Wald chi 2 (51) = 3610.4 Wald chi 2 (55) = 3636.0 
Adj. R 2 ﬁrst-stage 0.144 0.145 0.192 0.194 
Correlation of errors ( 𝜌) − 0.085 ∗∗∗ − 0.085 ∗∗∗ 
(0.023) (0.023) 
IV test of endogeneity / FIML Wald test of 
independent equations ( 𝜌= 0) 
F(1215) = 61.9 
( p = 0.000) 
F(1215) = 39.2 
( p = 0.000) 
Chi 2 (1) = 14.1 
(p = 0.000) 
Chi 2 (1) = 14.0 
(p = 0.000) 
IV overidentiﬁcation test Chi 2 (4) = 7.3 ( p = 0.121) 
LR test against unconstrained model Chi 2 (1) = 25.9 
( p = 0.000) 
Chi 2 (5) = 51.4 
( p = 0.000) 
Notes . ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the age-group-by-country level. The informal learning dependent 
variable is standardised. The standardised unemployment rate (at the age-group-by-country level, six years prior to the interview) is used as a selection instrument 
in columns (2) and (4) and columns (3) and (5) add the interaction of the latter with the corresponding standardised EPL indexes for permanent and temporary 
employment. All the estimations include a constant term. Other controls include dummies for occupation, industry, ﬁrm size, year of interview and country-ﬁxed 
eﬀects. The term AME denotes average marginal eﬀects. N = 25,853. 
27 
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26 Our training variable is a dummy of participation in job-related training dur- 
ing the previous 12 months. It is based on the following questions: During the 
last 12 months, have you (1) participated in courses conducted through open 
or distance education, (2) attended any organised sessions for on-the-job train- 
ing, (3) participated in seminars or workshops, or (4) participated in courses or 
private lessons not already reported? This variable takes the value one if the 
individual participated in any of these job-related activities and zero otherwise. 
The response rate to these questions was 90%, which reduced the sample size 
for this analysis to 23,232 observations. 
27 Since the endogenous SRM for a binary outcome follow a diﬀerent struc- 
ture, the Stata command etregress is inappropriate. We therefore used the gllamm 
program to ﬁt the correspondent models (3) and (4) . For a detailed descrip- 
tion of this command, see Rabe-Hesketh et al . (2005) and Miranda and Rabe- 
Hesketh (2006) . .2. Robustness of main results 
In assessing the robustness of our main ﬁndings, the most important
oncern is the possible misspeciﬁcation error of the contract selection
q. (2) . The ﬁrst issue we address is the sensitivity of our main estima-
ions to diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the probit model. We tested a range
f models in contrast to our FIML estimates in Table 4 and present the
esults in the Appendix A , Table A2 . 
Speciﬁcations in Panel A of Table A2 exclude the variables we in-
luded as determinants of temporary contract selection in our main esti-
ations in Table 4 . The table shows that excluding these regressors only
rom the selection Eq. (2) slightly lowers the estimated ATE. However,
he resulting coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from our main
stimate, which suggests that our model is robust. Only when country
ummies are excluded from the probit model, we observe an increase
n the estimated ATE from 0.22 to 0.28. This suggests that country-ﬁxed
ﬀects are important controls for the type of contract selection. The in-
rease in the ATE is, however, not excessive, since the unemployment
ate seems to capture these country diﬀerences in the absence of the
ountry-ﬁxed eﬀects in the probit equation (the average marginal eﬀect
f the unemployment rate increases from 0.015 to 0.027). 
Speciﬁcations in Panel B of Table A2 show how the main estimated
oeﬃcient of temporary contracts changes with the gradual introduc-
ion of control variables. Panel C shows the results of various alterna-
ive speciﬁcations. First, we estimate our main model including age as
 categorical variable (11 dummies of ﬁve-year age groups) instead of
he continuous variable. The resulting coeﬃcient is 0.208, with a stan-
ard error of 0.046; statistically the same size and signiﬁcance of our
ain estimates in Table 4 . Second, we include a polynomial of the sec-
nd order for tenure in an alternative speciﬁcation. Again, the resulting
oeﬃcients are very similar to our main results in Table 4 . 
Last, we run several other sensitivity analyses of our main speciﬁca-
ion, using various restricted samples. The results are shown in Panel D
f Table A2 . First, we exclude the individuals with a corresponding un-
mployment rate higher than 20% and 10%, as previously described in
ig. 1 . The resulting estimates are slightly lower but still the estimated
TE of interest remains signiﬁcant and of similar magnitude as that
f Table 4 . We also estimate our main model excluding non-European
ountries (i.e. Canada, Japan, and Korea). In this case, the estimate of
emporary contracts rises from 0.22 to 0.28 of a standard deviation. This
ndicates, as expected, some heterogeneity of the eﬀect between coun-
ries, and shows the robustness of our main result. To test for the pos-
ibility that our results are driven by a few countries, we continue with
ther speciﬁcations that exclude the countries with the largest shares
f temporary employees, that is, Poland, Korea, Spain and Slovak Re-
ublic. Similarly, in the next robustness test, we also exclude from our
ample those countries with the highest unemployment rates: Poland,
ermany and Slovak Republic. Finally, we test our main model restrict-
ng the sample to prime age workers, i.e., employees in the age ranges
0–64, 25–64, and 25–54. In all cases, the estimated ATE of interest
emains signiﬁcant and of similar magnitude as that of Table 4 . Only
he estimate from the sample of workers in ages 25–64 slightly declines
rom 0.22 to 0.18 of a standard deviation, which is explained later in
ection 5.4.1 by the decreasing eﬀect of temporary contracts on infor-
al learning with age. This can be veriﬁed here by observing the results
f the prime age workers (25–54) sample, which gives a signiﬁcant co-
ﬃcient of 0.21 of a standard deviation. It is important to note that the
redicted values of 𝜌 remain negative in all these robustness speciﬁca-
ions presented in Table A2 , indicating that our main results hold. The
ald tests are all signiﬁcant with 95% conﬁdence. 
.3. Informal learning and training: substitution or complementarity? 
A plausible explanation for temporary workers’ higher intensity of
nformal learning could be that, for workers with temporary contracts,28 n-the-job informal learning substitutes for the lack of formal training.
e test for this possibility in this section. 
.3.1. Training incidence 
In this subsection, we perform estimations to ﬁrst validate in our
ample the negative association of temporary contracts with training
articipation 26 found in various previous studies. 
The results in Table 5 conﬁrm that the temporary contract indicator
n our sample yields the expected negative coeﬃcient. The FIML results
n columns (2) and (3) indicate that the probit estimation (1) is biased
ownwards to some extent. Once the selection into the contract types
s controlled for, we ﬁnd that workers in temporary jobs are, on aver-
ge, 2.5 percentage points less likely to participate in training activities
han those in permanent employment are. The coeﬃcients of the co-
ariates included in these estimations are consistent with human capital
heory and ﬁndings in previous empirical literature (e.g. Booth, 1991 ;
reen, 1993 ). 
The negative value of 𝜌 suggests that unobservables that decrease
emporary contract selection probably occur with unobservables that
ncrease training participation, as suggested in Section 3 . For the FIML 27 
peciﬁcations (3) and (4), the Wald tests indicate that we can reject the
ull hypothesis of 𝜌 = 0 with 95% conﬁdence. 
.3.2. Complementarity 
The ﬁnding that workers with temporary contracts are less likely to
articipate in training but engage more intensively in informal learning
aises the question of whether informal learning is a training substitute
or temporary workers. 
To answer this question, we ﬁrst observe whether there is a diﬀer-
nce in the informal learning intensity of employees who undertook
raining and those who did not. Fig. 2 illustrates this diﬀerence among
emporary and permanent workers separately. This ﬁgure suggests com-
lementarity between training and informal learning, regardless of the
ype of contract, since the intensity of investments in the latter is shown
o be consistently larger when following training. This result holds for
oth temporary and permanent employees. 
To test whether there is, indeed, complementarity between train-
ng and informal learning, we include training participation and its in-
eraction with temporary contracts in our main equation for informal
earning. To provide reliable results, we use an additional selection in-
trument to correct for the potential endogeneity of formal training in
he informal learning equation. To this end, we apply the identiﬁcation
pproach of Leuven and Oosterbeek (2008) , which suggests that hav-
ng missed out on formal training opportunities for unexpected reasons
s a valid approximation to a random assignment to training. This is
chieved by using the information obtained through two designed sur-
ey questions. The ﬁrst is whether there was any training related to
ork that the respondent wanted to attend but did not do so. The sec-
nd asks whether this non-participation was due to some random event
uch as family circumstances, transient illness, or any other unexpected
ersonal or job-related incident. As shown in Panel C of Table 6 , having
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Table 5 
Estimations of job-related training participation. 
Probit (1) FIML (2) FIML (3) 
A. Training AME AME AME 
Temporary contract − 0.054 ∗∗∗ − 0.026 ∗∗∗ − 0.025 ∗∗∗ 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Age 0.010 ∗∗∗ 0.009 ∗∗∗ 0.009 ∗∗∗ 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age 2 ( ∗ 100) − 0.015 ∗∗∗ − 0.013 ∗∗∗ − 0.013 ∗∗∗ 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Years of education 0.012 ∗∗∗ 0.014 ∗∗∗ 0.014 ∗∗∗ 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Overeducated − 0.017 ∗∗ − 0.016 ∗∗∗ − 0.016 ∗∗∗ 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) 
Undereducated 0.028 ∗∗∗ 0.025 ∗∗∗ 0.025 ∗∗∗ 
(0.011) (0.008) (0.008) 
Learning attitude (std.) 0.035 ∗∗∗ 0.034 ∗∗∗ 0.034 ∗∗∗ 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Numeracy skills (std.) 0.033 ∗∗∗ 0.029 ∗∗∗ 0.029 ∗∗∗ 
(0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tenure 0.002 ∗∗∗ 0.002 ∗∗∗ 0.002 ∗∗∗ 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Working hours 0.003 ∗∗∗ 0.003 ∗∗∗ 0.003 ∗∗∗ 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Other controls yes yes yes 
B. Temporary Contract AME AME 
Unemployment rate (std.) 0.014 ∗∗∗ 0.011 ∗∗∗ 
(0.003) (0.003) 
EPL permanent (std.) 0.382 ∗∗∗ 
(0.130) 
EPL temporary (std.) − 0.230 ∗∗∗ 
(0.079) 
Unemployment ∗ 0.011 ∗∗ 
EPL temporary (0.005) 
Unemployment ∗ 0.012 ∗∗∗ 
EPL temporary (0.003) 
Other controls yes yes 
First-stage tests Wald chi 2 (51) = 3221.3 Wald chi 2 (55) = 3248.3 
Adj. R2 ﬁrst-stage 0.192 0.193 
Correlation of errors ( 𝜌) − 0.078 ∗∗ − 0.082 ∗∗ 
(0.035) (0.037) 
Wald test of independent equations ( 𝜌= 0) Chi 2 (1) = 4.12 (p = 0.042) Chi 2 (1) = 4.05 (p = 0.044) 
LR test against unconstrained model LR chi 2 (1) = 10.2 ( p = 0.001) LR chi 2 (5) = 18.8 ( p = 0.002) 
Notes . ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the age-group-by- 
country level. The training participation dependent variable is binary. The standardised unemployment rate (at 
the age-group-by-country level, six years prior to the interview) is used as a selection instrument in column (3) 
and column (4) adds the interaction of the latter with the corresponding standardised EPL indexes for permanent 
and temporary employment. All the estimations include a constant term and the same control variables as 
reported in Table 4 . The term AME denotes average marginal eﬀects. N = 23,232. 
Fig. 2. Complementarity between training and informal learning by type of contract. 
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Table 6 
Estimations of complementarity between training and informal learning. 
FIML (1) FIML (2) FIML (3) FIML (4) 
A. Informal Learning 
Temporary contract 0.224 ∗∗∗ 0.221 ∗∗∗ 0.220 ∗∗∗ 0.217 ∗∗∗ 
(0.051) (0.050) (0.045) (0.044) 
Training 0.190 ∗∗∗ 0.190 ∗∗∗ 0.074 ∗∗∗ 0.074 ∗∗∗ 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
Training ∗ Temporary contract 0.001 0.001 − 0.009 − 0.009 
(0.039) (0.039) (0.042) (0.042) 
Other controls yes yes yes yes 
B. Temporary Contract AME AME AME AME 
Unemployment rate (std.) 0.014 ∗∗∗ 0.011 ∗∗∗ 0.014 ∗∗∗ 0.010 ∗∗∗ 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
EPL permanent (std.) 0.372 ∗∗∗ 0.361 ∗∗∗ 
(0.129) (0.131) 
EPL temporary (std.) − 0.232 ∗∗∗ − 0.221 ∗∗∗ 
(0.074) (0.076) 
Unemployment ∗ EPL permanent 0.011 ∗∗ 0.011 ∗∗ 
(0.005) (0.005) 
Unemployment ∗ EPL temporary 0.011 ∗∗∗ 0.011 ∗∗∗ 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Other controls yes yes yes yes 
C. Training AME AME 
Training missed (random event) 0.064 ∗∗∗ 0.064 ∗∗∗ 
(0.023) (0.023) 
Other controls yes yes yes yes 
Correlation of errors ( 𝜌) − 0.082 ∗∗∗ − 0.079 ∗∗∗ − 0.082 ∗∗∗ − 0.081 ∗∗∗ 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Wald test of independent equations ( 𝜌= 0) Chi 2 (1) = 13.9 (p = 0.000) Chi 2 (1) = 13.6 (p = 0.000) Chi 2 (1) = 13.4 (p = 0.000) Chi 2 (1) = 13.2 (p = 0.000) 
Notes . ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the age-group-by-country level. The training participation 
dependent variable is binary. The standardised unemployment rate (at the age-group-by-country level, six years prior to the interview) is used as 
a selection instrument in columns (1) and (3), and columns (2) and (4) add the interaction of the latter with the corresponding standardised EPL 
indexes for permanent and temporary employment. The training missed independent variable is binary. All the estimations include a constant term 
and the same control variables as reported in Table 4 . The term AME denotes average marginal eﬀects. N = 23,232. 
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28 Informal learning increases with working hours only in the case of perma- 
nent workers. The number of working hours does not seem to aﬀect the informal 
learning intensity of temporary employees. 
29 Table 7 also shows that the coeﬃcient of age squared is not signiﬁcantly dif- 
ferent from zero for temporary employees, suggesting that the minimum turning 
point of learning investments at the end of employees’ working lives holds only 
for workers with a permanent contract. issed a training activity due to a random or unexpected event indeed
ncreases the probability of training participation by approximately 6
ercentage points. 
Panel A of Table 6 shows that the positive relation between infor-
al learning and job-related training holds after controlling for various
ndividual and employer characteristics. Speciﬁcations (3) and (4) that
ccount for the endogeneity of both temporary contracts and training
articipation show that, on average, participation in training activities
ncreases informal learning by 0.74 of a standard deviation. The magni-
ude of this complementarity does not diﬀer by type of contract, since
he interaction term is close to zero and statistically insigniﬁcant. This
nding shows that both the direction and size of the complementarity
etween informal learning and job-related training are equal for tempo-
ary and permanent employees, which suggests that the higher informal
earning investment of temporary workers does not seem to substitute
or their lack of formal training. Moreover, this result indicates that tem-
orary workers engage more intensively in informal learning, even after
ontrolling for training participation. 
.4. Heterogeneous eﬀects in informal learning 
To provide further insights into the possible mechanisms that could
xplain our main result, we analyse two types of heterogeneity: ﬁrst, the
eterogeneous learning investments of temporary and permanent work-
rs that could result from observed individual and job-content charac-
eristics, which allows us to distinguish between ATE and ATT; and, sec-
nd, heterogeneous eﬀects that could result from unobserved personal
haracteristics, which enable us to estimate MTEs. 
.4.1. Heterogeneous workers 
Although temporary workers are, on average, more intensively en-
aged in informal learning, this could diﬀer among workers with dif-30 erent characteristics. Temporary employees could, for instance, have
iﬀerent expectations for their career prospects. If that is the case, we
ight expect younger workers and those with shorter tenure to have
tronger incentives to engage in informal learning when they are em-
loyed in a temporary job, since this might help them to acquire a per-
anent contract. 
To investigate this heterogeneity, we estimate some endogenous
RM of informal learning that allow covariates to vary by contract type,
s explained in Section 3 . The signiﬁcant interaction results are shown
n Table 7 , which indicate that when allowing for heterogeneous re-
ponses to temporary contracts, our main conclusion holds. Both the
TE and ATT remain signiﬁcant and positive, the latter being of sim-
lar size to our estimation in Table 4 . These heterogeneous models of
nformal learning show that the coeﬃcients of age, tenure, and working
ours 28 diﬀer by type of contract, while years of education, educational
ismatches, learning attitude and numeracy skills do not. These re-
ults conﬁrm our expectations that the rates at which informal learning
ecreases with age 29 and tenure are signiﬁcantly greater for those with a
emporary contract. This ﬁnding suggests that our main result is partic-
larly driven by temporary employees who are younger and have lower
enure. More precisely, being a year older and having one additional
ear of tenure decreases informal learning by 0.026 and 0.008 of a stan-
ard deviation, respectively, in the case of temporary workers, whereas,
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Table 7 
Estimations of on-the-job informal learning with heterogeneous employees. 
FIML (1) FIML (2) 
A. Informal Learning 
ATE 0.179 ∗∗∗ 0.179 ∗∗∗ 
(0.047) (0.047) 
ATT 0.206 ∗∗∗ 0.206 ∗∗∗ 
(0.046) (0.046) 
Age − 0.022 ∗∗∗ − 0.022 ∗∗∗ 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Age ∗ TC − 0.004 ∗∗ − 0.004 ∗∗ 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Age 2 ( ∗ 100) 0.018 ∗∗∗ 0.018 ∗∗∗ 
(0.005) (0.005) 
Age 2 ( ∗ 100) ∗ TC − 0.018 ∗∗∗ − 0.018 ∗∗∗ 
(0.006) (0.006) 
Tenure − 0.002 ∗∗∗ − 0.002 ∗∗∗ 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Tenure ∗ TC − 0.006 ∗∗ − 0.006 ∗∗ 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Working hours 0.008 ∗∗∗ 0.008 ∗∗∗ 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Working hours ∗ TC − 0.007 ∗∗∗ − 0.007 ∗∗∗ 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Other controls and interactions yes yes 
B. Temporary Contract AME AME 
Unemployment rate (std.) 0.015 ∗∗∗ 0.012 ∗∗∗ 
(0.003) (0.003) 
EPL permanent (std.) 0.314 ∗∗∗ 
(0.115) 
EPL temporary (std.) − 0.194 ∗∗∗ 
(0.063) 
Unemployment ∗ EPL permanent 0.012 ∗∗ 
(0.005) 
Unemployment ∗ EPL temporary 0.009 ∗∗∗ 
(0.002) 
Other controls yes yes 
Correlation of errors ( 𝜌) − 0.049 ∗∗∗ − 0.049 ∗∗∗ 
(0.017) (0.017) 
Wald test of independent equations ( 𝜌= 0) Chi 2 (1) = 9.04 (p = 0.002) Chi 2 (1) = 8.52 (p = 0.003) 
Notes . ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the 
age-group-by-country level. The informal learning dependent variable is standardised. The 
standardised unemployment rate (at the age-group-by-country level, six years prior to the 
interview) is used as a selection instrument in column (1) and column (2) adds the interaction 
of the latter with the corresponding standardised EPL indexes for permanent and temporary 
employment. All the estimations include a constant term and the same control variables as 
reported in Table 4 . The term AME denotes average marginal eﬀects. N = 25,853. 
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30 In this survey, the informal learning measure is a categorical variable de- 
rived from the following question: How often, if at all, does your job involve 
learning new things? The respondent’s options were never, sometimes, usually, 
and always. We constructed a temporary contract dummy variable that takes 
the value one for ﬁxed-term/temporary agency contracts and zero for indeﬁ- 
nite/permanent contracts. We derive the dummy variable on the prospects of 
job stability from the following question: How likely or unlikely do you think it 
is that you will lose your job in the next two years? Please use a scale of from 0 
to 10, where 0 means very unlikely and 10 very likely. This variable takes the 
value of one (for a good prospect of job stability) if the answer given was below 
ﬁve and zero (indicating poor prospects of job stability) if the answer given was 
ﬁve or above. 
31 In this application, we also use the corresponding unemployment rate at the 
age-group-by-country level as the selection instrument. We use data for 2006, 
collected from the OECD Statistics website, seven years prior to the survey to or permanent employees, the decreases are 0.022 and 0.002 of a stan-
ard deviation. 
As mentioned previously, the larger investments in informal learn-
ng of temporary workers are expected to be more beneﬁcial earlier in
he working career, when the workers probably have better prospects
f gaining a permanent position. This suggests that the diﬀerence in in-
ormal learning investments between temporary and permanent work-
rs ends gradually and will vanish at some age and after some years of
enure. Nonetheless, it is not just a young, early career eﬀect. According
o estimation (2) in Table 7 , the positive ATE of temporary contracts
ecome insigniﬁcant (at the 95% conﬁdence level) after the age of 46.
imilarly, the positive ATE of temporary contracts disappear after ap-
roximately 8 years of tenure (see Fig. 3 ). This could probably be due
o workers adjusting their labour mobility expectations when they feel
rapped in a temporary job with no career prospects. 
If workers generally have stronger preferences for permanent con-
racts ( Booth et al., 2002; Holmlund and Storrie, 2002 ), it is reasonable
o think that ﬂexible workers rationally invest more in on-the-job in-
ormal learning to increase their chances of promotion to a more sta-
le/secure job. Thus, we could expect that employees with expectations
f upward mobility in the labour market are more likely to invest in in-
ormal learning. Since we cannot directly test for this mechanism with
a
31 he PIAAC data, we use data from the European Skills Survey (2014)
hat allow us to distinguish between temporary workers with good and
oor prospects of job stability, for some additional descriptive analyses.
Estimation results using data from the European Skills Survey, 30 
nd the application of a similar endogenous SRM that accounts for the
ndogeneity of selection into the type of contract, 31 indicate that full-void likely global crisis changes aﬀecting the comparability of these results 
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Fig. 3. Estimated ATE of temporary contracts on informal learning over age and tenure 
Contrasts of Linear Prediction and Marginal eﬀects computed based on the endogenous switching regression model (2) in Table 7 . The dotted line shows marginal 
eﬀects that are signiﬁcant with 95% conﬁdence at a minimum. 
Table 8 
Estimation coeﬃcients of informal learning by type of contract, European Skills Survey 2014. 
OLS OProbit FIML OLS OProbit FIML 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
A. Informal Learning 
Temporary contract 0.089 ∗∗∗ 0.126 ∗∗∗ 0.239 ∗∗∗ 0.047 ∗ 0.064 0.166 ∗∗ 
(0.020) (0.030) (0.064) (0.027) (0.040) (0.067) 
Good prospects of job stability 0.015 0.028 0.023 
(0.017) (0.025) (0.023) 
Temporary contract ∗ Good prospects 0.112 ∗∗∗ 0.167 ∗∗∗ 0.209 ∗∗∗ 
(0.039) (0.055) (0.060) 
Other controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
B. Temporary Contract AME AME 
Unemployment rate (std.) 0.014 ∗∗∗ 0.014 ∗∗∗ 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Other controls yes yes 
Correlation of errors ( 𝜌) − 0.065 ∗∗ − 0.069 ∗∗ 
(0.031) (0.032) 
Wald test of independent equations ( 𝜌= 0) Chi 2 (1) = 4.81 (p = 0.028) Chi 2 (1) = 4.74 (p = 0.029) 
Notes . ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the age-group-by-country level. Data come from 
the European Skills Survey, conducted in 21 European countries in 2014. The sample includes full-time workers aged 24–65 not enrolled 
in any formal education programme. The informal learning dependent variable is ordered in four categories (0–3). Good prospects of job 
stability refers to a low self-reported probability of losing the job in the next two years. Other controls include age, age square, educational 
level, education mismatch, tenure, working hours, learning attitude, occupation, industry, ﬁrm size and country dummies. The standardised 
unemployment rate for 2006 (at the age-group-by-country level, collected from the OECD statistics) is used as a selection instrument in 
the FIML estimations (3) and (6). The term AME denotes average marginal eﬀects. N = 17,442. 
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i  ime workers with a temporary contract particularly engage more in-
ensively in informal learning on the job than those with a permanent
ontract, when the temporary contract oﬀers opportunities for future
ob stability. Tables 8 and 9 show the respective results. In these data,
e also observe that the likelihood of job stability perceived by employ-
es with a temporary contract decreases with the worker’s age and years
f tenure with the same employer. 
These analyses provide further insights into the theoretical hypothe-
is (e.g. Weiss, 1986 ) that expectations of transition to permanent (more
table) employment could stimulate workers to make supplementary in-
estments in informal learning while in a temporary job as one of theith our main results derived from the PIAAC data. Since the informal learning 
nformation provided in this dataset has an ordered structure, we implemented 
n endogenous SRM that ﬁts an ordered probit model for the dependent variable. 
or this purpose, we used the cmp program. For a detailed description of this 
ommand, see Roodman (2011) . 
c  
e
 
d  
32 echanisms driving our main ﬁndings. We discuss this issue more in
etail in Section 6 . 
.4.2. Heterogeneous jobs 
Our main estimates could also diﬀer if ﬁrms select workers into tem-
orary versus permanent contracts because of the task content of dif-
erent jobs, which could lead to heterogeneity in informal learning op-
ortunities. For instance, it could be that high-skilled jobs or jobs that
ntail more task ﬂexibility and problem-solving tasks are less likely to
e selected for temporary contracts 32 and, at the same time, oﬀer more
nformal learning opportunities. To test for this heterogeneity, we in-
lude diﬀerent job-content characteristics and estimate heterogeneous
ﬀects in our interacted endogenous SRM. 
First, we do not ﬁnd any evidence that informal learning intensity
iﬀers between high-skilled and low-skilled temporary jobs, although32 Descriptive statistics are provided in Table A3 in the Appendix. 
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Table 9 
AME of temporary contracts on informal learning, European Skills Survey 2014. 
Informal learning Never Sometimes Usually Always 
Temporary contract (Perm. contract ref.) 
With good prospects − 0.007 ∗∗ − 0.048 ∗∗ 0.016 ∗∗∗ 0.039 ∗∗ 
of job stability (0.003) (0.021) (0.006) (0.018) 
With poor prospects − 0.015 ∗∗∗ − 0.123 ∗∗∗ 0.028 ∗∗∗ 0.110 ∗∗∗ 
of job stability (0.002) (0.023) (0.002) (0.023) 
Notes . ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered 
at the age-group-by-country level. This table shows average marginal eﬀects (AMEs) 
computed on the FIML speciﬁcation (6) of Table 8 . The dependent variable informal 
learning is measured by four ordinal categories as shown in the four columns. The AME 
for categorical variables is the discrete change from the base level. N = 17,442. 
t  
l  
i  
o  
t  
g  
I  
a  
p  
s  
ﬂ  
t  
w  
a  
I  
t  
i  
p  
e  
c  
g  
m  
a  
i
5
 
t  
S  
t  
w  
i  
c  
e  
c
 
v  
t  
f  
f  
t  
a  
t  
f  
a
 
w  
p
r
c  
p  
t  
o  
m
 
U  
e  
t  
u  
f  
a  
h  
u  
t  
m  
t  
h  
i  
c  
o  
a  
m  
c  
b  
b  
t  
p  
t  
e  
c  
i
6
 
t  
t  
l  
t  
i  
t
 
m  hose employed in high-skilled jobs are signiﬁcantly less likely to be se-
ected into temporary contracts and simultaneously tend to engage more
ntensively in learning on the job. 33 Second, by using the information
n task-content of jobs as provided by the PIAAC survey, we are able
o test for further heterogeneity. Table 10 shows that jobs that involve
reater task ﬂexibility, and more planning, literacy-related tasks and
CT-related tasks are less likely to be ﬁlled with individuals employed on
 temporary basis. The contrary occurs with jobs that more often involve
hysical tasks, while task collaboration and teamwork and problem-
olving and numeracy-related tasks do not seem to have a signiﬁcant in-
uence in job contract type selection. At the same time, Table 10 shows
hat employees tend to engage more intensively in informal learning
hen they are employed in jobs with higher levels of task ﬂexibility
nd teamwork and problem-solving, planning, numeracy-, literacy- and
CT-related tasks. Conversely, jobs with more physical-task content seem
o oﬀer fewer informal learning opportunities. More interestingly, the
nteraction coeﬃcients suggest no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between tem-
orary and permanent workers regarding the above results, the only
xception being the larger positive eﬀect on informal learning that task
ollaboration and teamwork has for temporary employees, which sug-
ests that interaction with peers particularly enhances on-the-job infor-
al learning of temporary workers. When including all these tasks char-
cteristics, we still ﬁnd the positive inﬂuence of temporary contracts on
nformal learning. 
.4.3. Heterogeneous eﬀects from unobservable characteristics (MTEs) 
There are reasons to expect further unobservable heterogeneity in
he informal learning outcomes of employees with a temporary contract.
ince workers diﬀer, for instance, in their ability, personality traits, and
he information and expectations they have about their future career
hen starting a job, individuals with diﬀerent unobservable character-
stics could respond diﬀerently to a temporary contract. Heterogeneity
ould also result from variety in the quality of temporary contracts, for
xample, regarding the chances of these being converted into permanent
ontracts. 
To investigate this heterogeneity, we estimate MTEs (at the mean
alue of all covariates in X ) along the 99 percentile points of the dis-
ribution of unobservables U D , computed on an endogenous SRM of in-
ormal learning similar to speciﬁcation (5) of Table 4 but allowing dif-
erent correlation parameters 𝜌 and variance 𝜎2 between permanent and
emporary workers, as explained in Section 3 . The corresponding results
re shown in Fig. 4 and Table A4 in the Appendix A . When allowing for
his heterogeneity, our main ﬁndings hold. The model ﬁts well and, in
act, the estimated ATE increases from 0.22 to 0.28 of a standard devi-
tion in comparison with our results in Table 4 . 
The MTE estimates describe whether informal learning outcomes for
orkers on the margin of a temporary job placement increase or de-33 The interaction term between temporary contracts and high-skilled occu- 
ations is not signiﬁcant with 90% of conﬁdence. Results are available upon 
equest. 
c
i
t
33 rease with the probability of being selected into a temporary contract,
 i ( Z i ), conditioned on marginal changes in the instrument. The MTEs
hen show if and to what extent the investments in informal learning
f employees change if they are shifted into a temporary contract by
arginally increasing the corresponding unemployment rate. 
Following Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) , in Fig. 4 the MTEs of low
 D values show the expected eﬀects in the informal learning of work-
rs who are more likely, due to unobserved reasons, to be selected into
emporary contracts, that is, those who would be selected even if the
nemployment rate was rather small. High U D values in Fig. 4 there-
ore represent workers with higher probabilities of being selected into
 permanent contract, which means that the unemployment rate would
ave to be very large to induce them to be in a temporary job. The
pward-sloping shape of the MTE curve in U D in Fig. 4 then indicates
hat the ATE of temporary contracts is higher for employees who are
ore likely to be selected in permanent jobs (high U D ), which means
hat the lower the likelihood of selection into a temporary contract, the
igher the informal learning investments of workers are expected to be
f they were in a temporary rather than in a permanent job. 34 This in-
rease in the MTEs at the upper levels of U D also suggests that workers
n the margin of a temporary job under the highest unemployment rates
re likely to have better unobserved characteristics (such as ability and
otivation) and thus would invest the most in learning on the job in
omparison with their counterparts in permanent jobs. This result could
e because these individuals know their odds of obtaining a more sta-
le position, given their own characteristics, and could be more able
o make informed choices of investing (or signalling) in learning to im-
rove those possibilities. These MTE results provide more insight into
he main mechanism we propose for our ﬁndings, that is, that employ-
es in temporary contracts who have better prospects for their future
areer would rationally invest more in on-the-job informal learning to
ncrease their chances of promotion to a permanent job. 
. Conclusions and discussion 
We have analysed the diﬀerence in informal learning at work be-
ween temporary and permanent male employees across 20 OECD coun-
ries. Human capital theory predicts that both ﬁrms and employees are
ess willing to invest in skills if workers are hired under temporary con-
racts. Remarkably, we ﬁnd that workers in temporary jobs engage more
ntensively in informal learning than permanent employees do, although
he former are, indeed, less likely to participate in formal training. 
We conclude that the diﬀerence in the intensity of on-the-job infor-
al learning between workers with temporary and permanent contracts34 The increasing MTE curve also indicates negative selection in unobserved 
haracteristics, in line with our hypotheses in Section 3 . This negative selection 
s also suggested if 𝜌1 > 𝜌0 ( Cornelissen et al., 2016 ), as shown in Table A6 in 
he Appendix. 
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Table 10 
Heterogeneous eﬀects of temporary contracts by job content characteristics. 
FIML (1) FIML (2) 
A. Informal Learning 
ATE 0.245 ∗∗∗ 0.244 ∗∗∗ 
(0.044) (0.045) 
ATT 0.261 ∗∗∗ 0.260 ∗∗∗ 
(0.045) (0.046) 
Task ﬂexibility 0.015 ∗∗ 0.015 ∗∗ 
(0.007) (0.007) 
Task ﬂexibility ∗ TC − 0.001 − 0.001 
(0.022) (0.022) 
Task collaboration - teamwork 0.166 ∗∗∗ 0.166 ∗∗∗ 
(0.009) (0.009) 
Task collaboration - teamwork ∗ TC 0.049 ∗∗ 0.049 ∗∗ 
(0.020) (0.020) 
Problem-solving tasks 0.136 ∗∗∗ 0.136 ∗∗∗ 
(0.008) (0.008) 
Problem-solving tasks ∗ TC 0.004 0.004 
(0.020) (0.020) 
Planning tasks 0.029 ∗∗∗ 0.029 ∗∗∗ 
(0.007) (0.007) 
Planning tasks ∗ TC − 0.025 − 0.025 
(0.020) (0.020) 
Physical tasks 0.007 0.007 
(0.008) (0.008) 
Physical tasks ∗ TC − 0.012 − 0.012 
(0.021) (0.021) 
Numeracy-related tasks 0.031 ∗∗∗ 0.031 ∗∗∗ 
(0.010) (0.010) 
Numeracy-related tasks ∗ TC − 0.003 − 0.003 
(0.025) (0.025) 
Literacy-related tasks 0.151 ∗∗∗ 0.151 ∗∗∗ 
(0.011) (0.011) 
Literacy-related tasks ∗ TC − 0.034 − 0.034 
(0.032) (0.032) 
ICT-related tasks 0.048 ∗∗∗ 0.048 ∗∗∗ 
(0.012) (0.012) 
ICT-related tasks ∗ TC 0.006 0.006 
(0.030) (0.030) 
Other controls yes yes 
B. Temporary Contract AME AME 
Unemployment rate (std.) 0.015 ∗∗∗ 0.011 ∗∗∗ 
(0.003) (0.003) 
EPL permanent (std.) 0.249 ∗∗ 
(0.012) 
EPL temporary (std.) − 0.160 ∗∗ 
(0.071) 
Unemployment ∗ EPL permanent 0.011 ∗∗ 
(0.005) 
Unemployment ∗ EPL temporary 0.007 ∗∗ 
(0.003) 
Task ﬂexibility − 0.005 ∗∗ − 0.005 ∗∗ 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Task collaboration and teamwork 0.003 0.003 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Problem-solving tasks − 0.001 − 0.001 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Planning tasks − 0.007 ∗∗∗ − 0.007 ∗∗∗ 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Physical tasks 0.009 ∗∗∗ 0.009 ∗∗∗ 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Numeracy-related tasks 0.000 0.000 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Literacy- related tasks − 0.009 ∗∗ − 0.009 ∗∗ 
(0.004) (0.004) 
ICT-related tasks − 0.015 ∗∗∗ − 0.015 ∗∗∗ 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Other controls yes yes 
Correlation of errors ( 𝜌) − 0.095 ∗∗∗ − 0.094 ∗∗∗ 
(0.027) (0.027) 
( continued on next page ) 
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Table 10 ( continued ) 
FIML (1) FIML (2) 
Wald test of independent Chi 2 (1) = 12.5 Chi 2 (1) = 12.1 
equations ( 𝜌= 0) ( p = 0.000) ( p = 0.001) 
Notes . ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the age- 
group-by-country level. The informal learning dependent variable is standardised. The standardised 
unemployment rate (at the age-group-by-country level, six years prior to the interview) is used 
as a selection instrument in column (1) and column (2) adds the interaction of the latter with 
the corresponding standardised EPL indexes for permanent and temporary employment. All the 
estimations include a constant term and the same control variables as reported in Table 4 . The 
term AME denotes average marginal eﬀects. N = 23,069. 
Fig. 4. Estimated MTE of temporary contracts on informal learning. 
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w  s positive and between 0.22 and 0.28 of a standard deviation. 35 These
esults account for the endogeneity of the selection into temporary con-
racts by estimating FIML endogenous switching regression models that
xploit workers’ diﬀerential exposure to unemployment and employ-
ent protection legislation across countries and age groups. 
Our ﬁndings could be driven by several mechanisms. Although the
IAAC data do not allow us to assess the particular mechanism behind
ur main results, we can discard some of the possible explanations and
rovide further insights on these relevant mechanisms. 
First, the hypothesis that temporary workers could substitute infor-
al learning for the lack of formal training is not supported by our anal-
sis. Instead, we ﬁnd complementarity between these two types of learn-
ng, which is consistent with the idea that human capital accumulated
hrough training not only provides workers with higher skills but could
lso increase their informal learning capacity ( Rosen, 1972 ). 
Second, we do not ﬁnd support for the view that high-skilled work-
rs drive the diﬀerence in informal learning between temporary and
ermanent male employees. Although we ﬁnd that particularly peer in-35 This diﬀerence is substantial if we consider that having a temporary con- 
ract has a similar impact on informal learning as approximately 10 years of 
chooling. 
w  
i
35 eraction enhances the intensity of informal learning among temporary
mployees, their diﬀerence in informal learning in comparison with per-
anent workers is not driven by heterogeneity in the task content of
emporary jobs. 
However, the higher informal learning investments of temporary em-
loyees might be driven by the incentives of ﬁnding a more stable job. If
orkers generally prefer permanent contracts ( Booth et al., 2002; Holm-
und and Storrie, 2002 ), it is reasonable to think that those in tempo-
ary jobs could have stronger incentives to invest in on-the-job learning
o increase their chances of promotion to a more secure job. 36 In line
ith this hypothesis, we ﬁnd that the positive inﬂuence of temporary
ontracts is larger earlier in workers’ careers, when workers generally
ave better prospects of transition to permanent employment than later
n their career. Additional descriptive results from the European Skills
urvey that allow us to distinguish between temporary workers with
nd without prospects of job stability in the near future, suggest that
he intensity of informal learning is likely higher for temporary workers
ho have better expectations of job stability. These results are consistent
ith our MTE analysis when using the PIAAC dataset, which shows that36 This could be incentivised by the lower opportunity costs of informal learn- 
ng in contrast to training ( Destré et al., 2008 ). 
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Ahe expected eﬀects in informal learning are signiﬁcantly higher among
orkers with a temporary contract who are more likely to be selected
nto permanent contracts due to their unobservable characteristics. This
nding suggests that those who know about their better chances of ob-
aining a permanent job position, given their own characteristics, are
hose expected to show a higher intensity of informal learning at work,
hich could help to improve these chances in their favour. 
This analysis suggests that workers may perceive more intense learn-
ng as a proﬁtable investment in their career development, particularly
hen facing the uncertainty of a temporary contract. As explained by
eiss (1986) , the possibility of shifting to a better job aﬀects the returns
o human capital and, therefore, increases the incentives for supplemen-
ary investments in learning activities while working. Furthermore, if
hese investments are positively aﬀected by a lower discount rate be-
ause future perspectives become more important, incentives for self-
nvestment increase and give rise to human capital accumulation until
 more stable job is obtained. 
Our ﬁndings could then be likely driven by the mechanism suggested
n the literature on the stepping-stone eﬀects of temporary employment.
ost of these studies evoke the idea that the odds of transition from tem-
orary to permanent jobs likely increase with investments in on-the-job
earning and the improvement of skills while gaining work experience
e.g. Autor, 2001; Booth et al., 2002; Gagliarducci, 2005; De Graaf-Zijl
t al., 2011; Cockx and Picchio, 2012 ). This implies that, if human cap-
tal investments on the job decline over the lifecycle by a search for a
etter job, accepting a temporary job that might pay less initially but
nvolves higher learning potential can be a good strategy for workers in
heir early careers, since such jobs are more likely to have a stepping-
tone eﬀect ( Sicherman and Galor, 1990; Heckman et al., 2002 ). 
The implicit stepping-stone incentive of temporary jobs as a plausible
xplanation for our results also relates to the literature on job match-
ng and screening. If ﬁrms use temporary contracts to select the best
orkers for permanent positions, human capital acquired through learn-
ng on the job becomes an important source for ﬁrms to investigate the
uality of the match and productivity of potential permanent employees
 Autor, 2001; Nagypál, 2007; Faccini, 2014 ). Temporary contracts could
hen also increase workers’ incentives to signal positively their skills and
roductivity by accumulating more job-speciﬁc expertise through on-
he-job learning. 
Our analyses point towards a potential positive feature of temporary
ontracts that has important implications. Temporary jobs need not be
ead-end jobs. If temporary jobs are taken by individuals in lieu of un-36 mployment in search for further individual promotion in the labour
arket, these jobs could oﬀer them opportunities for learning by doing
articular tasks and productive interaction with other workers. This is
mportant not only as a source of productive accumulation of human
apital while working but also as a potential advantage for individuals
ho would otherwise be unemployed. Such jobs with high learning con-
ent might then be a stepping stone towards more stable employment. 
The challenge of harnessing the learning potential of temporary em-
loyment also implies the reduction of the training participation penalty
nduced by the short duration of contracts. This penalty might not only
ontribute to disparities in the labour market but, as we show, could
lso compromise the beneﬁts of the complementarity between formal
raining and informal learning. Our complementarity analysis suggests
wo diﬀerent kinds of temporary jobs in terms of their learning opportu-
ities: (1) good temporary jobs, with high levels of task autonomy and
ollaboration, more teamwork and problem-solving tasks, oﬀering good
pportunities for training and informal learning and, likely, leading to
ositive career expectations of upward mobility, and (2) bad temporary
obs, which have no or very few opportunities to foster workers’ human
apital. In the latter jobs, workers could get trapped in a cycle between
recarious jobs and unemployment. Thus, our study suggests that labour
egmentation occurs not only between permanent and temporary jobs
ut also within temporary employment due to the distinction between
emporary jobs of low and high learning content. 
Policy makers have already stressed the importance of ﬁnding ‘an
ppropriate balance between ﬂexibility and security’ to prevent part of
he labour force from becoming trapped in dead-end jobs (so-called ﬂexi-
urity agenda, European Commission, 2007 ). Access to opportunities for
orkers’ human capital development remains a crucial issue for many
overnments to create such a balance. These policies should therefore
e supported by analysing how contract incentives inﬂuence workers’
kill investments and their career development expectations. The design
f these policies underlines the importance of improving ﬁrms’ learning
trategies to optimise the beneﬁts of both training and informal learning
s a means of fostering not only successful transitions and the sustain-
ble employability of a ﬂexible workforce but also the aggregate pro-
uctive capacity of the economy in the long term. In this respect, it is
mportant that further longitudinal research would aim to identify the
ausal eﬀects of both formal training and informal learning on workers’
ransition from temporary to permanent jobs. 
ppendix A. Additional analyses 
Tables A3 and A4 . 
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Table A1 
Training participation of the unemployed. 
Probit Job-related training (1) Job-related training (2) Any type of training (3) Any type of training (4) 
AME AME AME AME 
Unemployment − 0.002 0.009 0.003 0.010 
rate t (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) 
Years of 0.015 ∗∗∗ 0.016 ∗∗∗ 
education (0.003) (0.003) 
Learning attitude 0.033 ∗∗∗ 0.033 ∗∗∗ 
(0.008) (0.008) 
Numeracy skills 0.001 ∗∗ 0.001 ∗∗∗ 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Other controls yes yes yes yes 
N 3209 3139 3348 3264 
Notes . ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The dependent variable is the dummy of participation in training. Unemploy- 
ment rate t is the standardised unemployment rate (at the age-group-by-country level, same year of the interview) is the 
independent variable. Other controls include age and country-ﬁxed eﬀects. The term AME denotes average marginal 
eﬀects. 
Table A2 
Estimations of informal learning intensity (sensitivity tests). 
ATE (1) 𝜌 Wald test 𝜌= 0 Chi 2 (1) ATE (2) 𝜌 Wald test 𝜌= 0 Chi 2 (1) 
Panel A. Probit speciﬁcations excluding 
Overeducated and undereducated 0.179 ∗∗∗ − 0.062 ∗∗∗ 7.33 0.177 ∗∗∗ − 0.061 ∗∗∗ 7.11 
(0.045) (0.023) (p = 0.007) (0.045) (0.023) (p = 0.008) 
Learning attitude 0.181 ∗∗∗ − 0.062 ∗∗∗ 7.30 0.181 ∗∗∗ − 0.061 ∗∗∗ 7.08 
(0.045) (0.023) (p = 0.007) (0.045) (0.023) (p = 0.008) 
Numeracy skills 0.184 ∗∗∗ − 0.066 ∗∗∗ 7.37 0.181 ∗∗∗ − 0.065 ∗∗∗ 7.20 
(0.047) (0.024) (p = 0.007) (0.047) (0.024) (p = 0.007) 
Tenure 0.189 ∗∗∗ − 0.053 ∗∗∗ 6.91 0.187 ∗∗∗ − 0.053 ∗∗∗ 6.82 
(0.042) (0.020) (p = 0.009) (0.042) (0.020) (p = 0.009) 
Working hours 0.175 ∗∗∗ − 0.059 ∗∗∗ 6.35 0.172 ∗∗∗ − 0.057 ∗∗∗ 6.08 
(0.045) (0.023) (p = 0.012) (0.045) (0.023) (p = 0.014) 
Occupation 0.179 ∗∗∗ − 0.059 ∗∗∗ 6.25 0.176 ∗∗∗ − 0.057 ∗∗∗ 5.81 
(0.045) (0.023) (p = 0.012) (0.045) (0.023) (p = 0.016) 
Industry 0.174 ∗∗∗ − 0.060 ∗∗∗ 6.75 0.176 ∗∗∗ − 0.061 ∗∗∗ 6.90 
(0.045) (0.023) (p = 0.009) (0.045) (0.023) (p = 0.009) 
Firm size 0.182 ∗∗∗ − 0.062 ∗∗∗ 7.52 0.180 ∗∗∗ − 0.062 ∗∗∗ 7.71 
(0.045) (0.022) (p = 0.006) (0.045) (0.022) (p = 0.006) 
Occupation, industry and ﬁrm size 0.178 ∗∗∗ − 0.062 ∗∗∗ 7.11 0.175 ∗∗∗ − 0.061 ∗∗∗ 6.82 
(0.046) (0.023) (p = 0.008) (0.046) (0.023) (p = 0.009) 
Country ﬁxed eﬀects 0.282 ∗∗∗ − 0.122 ∗∗∗ 23.5 0.284 ∗∗∗ − 0.124 ∗∗∗ 25.1 
(0.049) (0.025) (p = 0.000) (0.048) (0.025) (p = 0.000) 
Panel B. Adding controls 
Year of interview and country 0.394 ∗∗∗ − 0.168 ∗∗∗ 36.5 0.393 ∗∗∗ − 0.167 ∗∗∗ 35.6 
N = 26,495 (0.058) (0.028) (p = 0.000) (0.045) (0.028) (p = 0.000) 
Age, age 2 and years of education 0.145 ∗∗∗ − 0.044 ∗∗ 4.38 0.143 ∗∗∗ − 0.042 ∗∗ 4.31 
N = 26,338 (0.051) (0.021) (p = 0.036) (0.050) (0.021) (p = 0.038) 
Learning attitude and numeracy skills 0.154 ∗∗∗ − 0.052 ∗∗∗ 6.78 0.151 ∗∗∗ − 0.051 ∗∗ 6.46 
N = 26,315 (0.044) (0.020) (p = 0.010) (0.044) (0.020) (p = 0.011) 
Overeducated and undereducated 0.158 ∗∗∗ − 0.050 ∗∗ 6.06 0.156 ∗∗∗ − 0.049 ∗∗ 5.80 
N = 26,315 (0.044) (0.020) (p = 0.014) (0.044) (0.020) (p = 0.016) 
Occupation 0.176 ∗∗∗ − 0.049 ∗∗ 6.33 0.174 ∗∗∗ − 0.048 ∗∗ 6.25 
N = 25,966 (0.041) (0.020) (p = 0.012) (0.041) (0.020) (p = 0.012) 
Industry and ﬁrm size 0.192 ∗∗∗ − 0.053 ∗∗∗ 6.85 0.190 ∗∗∗ − 0.052 ∗∗∗ 6.65 
N = 25,853 (0.043) (0.020) (p = 0.009) (0.043) (0.020) (p = 0.010) 
Tenure and working hours 0.223 ∗∗∗ − 0.085 ∗∗∗ 14.1 0.221 ∗∗∗ − 0.085 ∗∗∗ 14.0 
N = 25,853 (0.045) (0.023) (p = 0.000) (0.045) (0.023) (p = 0.000) 
Panel C. Alternative speciﬁcations 
Age variable in 5-year categories 0.208 ∗∗∗ − 0.074 ∗∗∗ 9.90 0.206 ∗∗∗ − 0.073 ∗∗∗ 9.70 
N = 25,853 (0.046) (0.023) (p = 0.002) (0.046) (0.023) (p = 0.002) 
Including tenure square term 0.212 ∗∗∗ − 0.101 ∗∗∗ 23.8 0.213 ∗∗∗ − 0.101 ∗∗∗ 24.2 
N = 25,853 (0.040) (0.020) (p = 0.000) (0.040) (0.020) (p = 0.000) 
Panel D. Restricted samples 
Unemployment rate < = 0.2 0.190 ∗∗∗ − 0.066 ∗∗∗ 7.16 0.188 ∗∗∗ − 0.066 ∗∗∗ 6.96 
N = 25,249 (0.045) (0.023) (p = 0.007) (0.045) (0.023) (p = 0.008) 
Unemployment rate < = 0.1 0.178 ∗∗∗ − 0.054 ∗∗ 5.14 0.175 ∗∗∗ − 0.054 ∗∗ 4.98 
N = 20,986 (0.048) (0.024) (p = 0.023) (0.048) (0.024) (p = 0.026) 
( continued on next page ) 
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Table A2 ( continued ) 
ATE (1) 𝜌 Wald test 𝜌= 0 Chi 2 (1) ATE (2) 𝜌 Wald test 𝜌= 0 Chi 2 (1) 
Training sample 0.217 ∗∗∗ − 0.082 ∗∗∗ 13.5 0.214 ∗∗∗ − 0.081 ∗∗∗ 13.1 
N = 22,232 (0.044) (0.022) (p = 0.000) (0.044) (0.022) (p = 0.000) 
Excl. non-EU countries 0.280 ∗∗∗ − 0.096 ∗∗∗ 19.0 0.279 ∗∗∗ − 0.096 ∗∗∗ 18.7 
N = 21,989 (0.042) (0.022) (p = 0.000) (0.042) (0.022) (p = 0.000) 
Excl. Poland and Korea 0.238 ∗∗∗ − 0.084 ∗∗∗ 10.8 0.237 ∗∗∗ − 0.084 ∗∗∗ 10.8 
N = 23,153 (0.049) (0.025) (p = 0.001) (0.049) (0.025) (p = 0.001) 
Excl. Poland, Korea, Spain, Slovak Rep. 0.246 ∗∗∗ − 0.093 ∗∗∗ 8.34 0.248 ∗∗∗ − 0.094 ∗∗∗ 9.04 
N = 20,864 (0.059) (0.032) (p = 0.004) (0.057) (0.031) (p = 0.003) 
Excl. Poland, Germany, and Slovak Rep. 0.204 ∗∗∗ − 0.078 ∗∗∗ 7.73 0.203 ∗∗∗ − 0.077 ∗∗∗ 7.61 
N = 21,763 (0.054) (0.028) (p = 0.005) (0.054) (0.028) (p = 0.006) 
Employees in age 20 – 64 0.215 ∗∗∗ − 0.079 ∗∗∗ 11.2 0.213 ∗∗∗ − 0.078 ∗∗∗ 10.8 
N = 25,618 (0.047) (0.024) (p = 0.000) (0.048) (0.024) (p = 0.001) 
Employees in age 25 – 64 0.176 ∗∗∗ − 0.043 ∗∗ 5.27 0.171 ∗∗∗ − 0.042 ∗∗ 4.90 
N = 23,780 (0.059) (0.021) (p = 0.022) (0.046) (0.021) (p = 0.027) 
Employees in age 25 – 54 0.210 ∗∗∗ − 0.075 ∗∗∗ 10.4 0.204 ∗∗∗ − 0.071 ∗∗∗ 9.52 
N = 19,791 (0.042) (0.023) (p = 0.001) (0.041) (0.023) (p = 0.002) 
Notes . ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the age-group-by-country level. The informal 
learning dependent variable is standardised. The standardised unemployment rate (at the age-group-by-country level, six years prior to 
the interview) is used as a selection instrument in the estimations presented in column (1), whereas estimations in column (2) add the 
interaction of the latter with the corresponding standardised EPL indexes for permanent and temporary employment. 
Table A3 
Other summary statistics. 
Variable Permanent Temporary Diﬀ. All 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. p-value Min Max 
Job-content characteristics 
High-skilled occupations 0.47 0.50 0.30 0.46 0.000 0 1 
Task discretion (standardised index) a 0.11 0.99 − 0.26 1.08 0.000 − 2.81 2.43 
Task collaboration and team work (standardised index) a 0.06 0.92 0.09 0.99 0.096 − 2.69 1.05 
Problem-solving tasks (standardised index) a 0.12 0.94 − 0.12 1.06 0.000 − 2.28 1.17 
Planning tasks (standardised index) a 0.06 1.02 − 0.14 0.95 0.000 − 2.74 3.82 
Physical tasks (standardised) 0.01 0.98 0.35 0.95 0.000 − 1.09 1.13 
Numeracy-related tasks (standardised index) 0.16 0.98 − 0.18 1.05 0.000 − 1.68 3.55 
Literacy-related tasks (standardised index) 0.11 0.94 − 0.33 1.17 0.000 − 2.82 4.29 
ICT-related tasks (standardised index) 0.07 1.01 − 0.37 1.04 0.000 − 1.37 2.71 
Other characteristics 
Job satisfaction 0.01 0.98 − 0.19 1.04 0.000 − 3.63 1.18 
Learning motivation − 0.12 0.98 − 0.06 1.07 0.085 − 3.32 1.24 
Political eﬃcacy perception a − 0.01 1.01 − 0.10 1.00 0.000 − 1.38 1.83 
Social trust a − 0.03 0.97 − 0.22 0.88 0.000 − 1.41 2.60 
Health status − 0.01 0.98 − 0.02 1.01 0.860 − 1.50 2.59 
Observations 22,795 3058 25,853 
a Due to lower response rate, we have fewer observations for these variables. 
Table A4 
MTEs estimates and standard errors. 
U_D 1 0.128 ∗∗ U_D 30 0.241 ∗∗∗ U_D 60 0.306 ∗∗∗ U_D 90 0.359 ∗∗ 
(0.053) (0.078) (0.102) (0.151) 
U_D 10 0.192 ∗∗∗ U_D 40 0.269 ∗∗∗ U_D 70 0.327 ∗∗∗ U_D 99 0.437 ∗∗ 
(0.044) (0.086) (0.115) (0.216) 
U_D 20 0.220 ∗∗∗ U_D 50 0.282 ∗∗∗ U_D 80 0.342 ∗∗ 
(0.056) (0.098) (0.126) 
ATE 0.279 ∗∗∗ rho1 − 0.112 ∗∗ rho0 − 0.054 ∗∗ |rho1| – 0.058 ∗∗ 
(0.096) (0.048) (0.023) |rho0| (0.026) 
Notes . ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors bootstrapped with 200 replica- 
tions in parentheses (each replication is a bootstrap sample of clusters at the age-group- 
by-country level). This table shows the average treatment eﬀects (ATEs) for each per- 
centile of the distribution of U_D, computed at the mean value of all covariates in a FIML 
speciﬁcation similar to speciﬁcation (5) of Table 4 that allows for diﬀerent correlation parameters 𝜌1 ≠ 𝜌0 . N = 25,853. 38 
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